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I. INTRODUCTION
A documentary letter of credit is supposed to provide an effective
assurance of payment by a financially responsible third-party is-
suer, typically a bank.1 But, under Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") Article 5,2 the American law governing letters of credit, the
issuer is obligated to the beneficiary to honor only a documentary presen-
tation that appears on its face strictly to comply with the letter of credit's
terms and conditions.3 Unless otherwise agreed, the issuer also has a stat-
utory duty to the applicant to dishonor a documentary presentation
that does not appear on its face strictly to comply with the letter of
credit's terms and conditions. 4 With respect to commercial letters of
1. Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2494, 2495 (2000) [hereinafter Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit] ("The classic
explanation claims that the letter of credit provides an effective assurance of payment from
a financially responsible third party.").
2. The Official Text of Article 5's 1995 revision will be cited as "U.C.C. section num-
ber" without special designation. The Official Text of the prior 1962 version will be cited
as "1962 U.C.C. section number." The 1995 revision of Article 5 has been enacted by
every state except Wisconsin. See http://www.nccusl.orgfUpdate/uniformact-factsheets/
uniformacts-fs-ucca5.asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
3. U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (providing that the issuer shall honor a presentation that ap-
pears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit).
The issuer's breach of this statutory obligation to the beneficiary is "wrongful dishonor."
See id. § 5-111(a) (imposing liability "[i]f an issuer wrongfully dishonors .... ").
4. Id. § 5-108(a) & cmt. 7 (explaining that, unless otherwise provided or agreed, the
issuer has an obligation to the applicant to dishonor a presentation of documents that does
not apparently facially strictly comply with the letter of credit's terms and conditions); id.
§ 5-108 cmt. 1 (providing examples of permissible contractual variations of the issuer's ob-
ligation to the applicant). The issuer's violation of this duty to the applicant is "wrongful
honor." See James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, Letters of Credit: 1998 Cases, 54 Bus.
LAW. 1885, 1903-04 (1999) [hereinafter Barnes & Byrne, 1998 Cases] ("Most post-honor
reimbursement cases involve applicant claims that the issuer wrongfully honored the bene-
ficiary's presentation .... ").
The documentary conditions in a letter of credit typically are the documents required by
the application-reimbursement agreement between the applicant and the issuer. Gerald T.
McLaughlin, Exploring Boundaries: A Legal and Structural Analysis of the Independence
Principle of Letter of Credit Law, 119 BANKING L.J. 501, 507 (2002) [hereinafter McLaugh-
lin, The Independence Principle] (explaining that the issuer "incorporates in the text of the
credit the documents specified in ... [the] application .... ). The issuer's breach of its
statutory obligation to the applicant to dishonor a presentation of documents that does not
on its face apparently strictly comply consequently also can breach the application-reim-
bursement agreement. In both cases, at most direct and incidental damages are recover-
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credit,5 there is ample evidence that documentary presentations are likely
to contain discrepancies. 6 Nevertheless, the beneficiary usually is able to
obtain honor through the applicant's ad hoc waiver of documentary de-
fects following an inquiry by the issuer.7 As the Second Circuit observed
in Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 8 "This process is
efficient, and the law should encourage it . . .-
The process can be abused. In E & H Partners v. Broadway National
Bank,10 the issuer supplied the applicant with copies of all the documents
presented.11 The applicant's attorney wrote a letter to the issuer identify-
able. See U.C.C. §5-111(b) (providing that the applicant's recoverable damages for
wrongful honor do not include either consequential damages or amounts saved as a result
of breach); id. § 5-111(b) cmt. 2 (explaining that improper honor may or may not damage
the applicant).
5. See infra notes 21 and 25 and accompanying text for the distinction between com-
mercial and standby letters of credit.
6. See Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2495 (stating that banker
and lawyer interviewees "uniformly claimed that sellers ordinarily do not present docu-
ments that conform to the requirements of the letter of credit"); see INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 500, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES FOR Docu-
MENTARY CREDITS 4 (1993) [hereinafter UCP 500] ("Some surveys indicate that approxi-
mately fifty percent of the documents presented under the Documentary Credit are
rejected because of discrepancies or apparent discrepancies."). In Professor Mann's sam-
ple, the waiver rate was substantially in excess of 50 percent. See infra note 7 and accom-
panying text.
The International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") is a nongovernmental organization
serving world business with members in 123 countries. See UCP 500, supra, at 54. Bankers
in most countries and in every major financial center rely upon the UCP. See James E.
Byrne, Fundamental Issues in the Unification and Harmonization of Letter of Credit Law,
37 Loy. L. REV. 1, 3 n.5 (1991) (noting that the UCP has achieved virtually universal
adherence). The operative version of the UCP is revised and renumbered periodically.
The version immediately preceding UCP 500 was UCP 400. See INTERNATIONAL CHAM-
BER OF COMMERCE, PUB No. 511, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS: UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED
III (Charles del Busto ed., 1993) [hereinafter UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED] (comparing
UCP 400 and UCP 500).
In 2003, the ICC published a compilation of international standard-banking practice
under UCP 500. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 645, INTERNA-
TIONAL STANDARD BANKING PRACTICE (2003) [hereinafter ISBP]. The ISBP does not
amend UCP 500 and should not be separately incorporated into a letter of credit. Its func-
tion is to clarify the significance of incorporation of UCP 500 into a letter of credit. Id. at
8-9 (stating that the ISBP explains rather than amends UCP 500 and its incorporation into
a letter of credit is discouraged).
7. See Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2513-14 ("[E]ven when
the documents suggest a default on the underlying contract, applicants almost always waive
the discrepancies and permit full payment .... [Aipplicants generally waived promptly.").
See Margaret L. Moses, The Irony of International Letters of Credit: They Aren't Secure,
But They (Usually) Work, 120 BANKING L.J. 479, 484-89 (2003) (discussing of the function
of a negotiable bill of lading consigned to the issuing or confirming bank in motivating
applicants to waive documentary discrepancies with respect to commercial letters of
credit). Refer to notes 21-24 infra and accompanying text for the concept of a commercial
letter of credit. But see Suntex Indus. Corp. v. The CIT Group[BBC, Inc., 2001 WL
34401367, at *2 (D. Del. 2001), aff'd, 2002 WL 1012964 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that the
guarantor of the applicant's obligation to reimburse the issuer was entitled to exercise a
contractual right to veto the applicant's waiver of discrepancies).
8. 982 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1992).
9. Id. at 824.
10. 39 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). E & H Partners was decided properly.
11. Id. at 278-79.
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ing discrepancies, and the issuer's notice of dishonor and discrepancies
with respect to the first presentation of documents mirrored the attor-
ney's letter.12 The court held that the applicant also played an undue role
in the issuer's decision to dishonor the second presentation of docu-
ments. 13 In the beneficiary's action for wrongful dishonor, the issuer was
estopped from asserting that the second presentation had been discrep-
ant. 14 Other problems include legal and practice rules that unnecessarily
hamper the issuer's good faith inquiry about the applicant's willingness to
waive discrepancies.1 5
This article discusses the extent to which nonabusive intentional appli-
cant ad hoc waiver of known documentary discrepancies 16 is facilitated by
the three regimes17 of contemporary American letter-of-credit law:
U.C.C. Article 5,18 the 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Prac-
tices for Documentary Credits (UCP 500), 19 and the 1998 International
Standby Practices (ISP 98).20
12. Id.
13. Id. at 284-85.
14. Id. at 284-85 (alternative holding). The other holding was that the beneficiary's
second presentation had conformed to the letter of credit. Id. at 281-84.
Issuers must protect themselves against E & H Partners estoppel by insulating their eval-
uation of the documents presented from undue intrusion by the applicant. See infra notes
147-48 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 165-76, 276-83 and accompanying text.
16. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. E.g., Oei v. Citibank,
N.A., 957 F. Supp. 492, 509-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the applicant could not have
waived documentary discrepancies of which he was unaware).
17. The 1995 U.N. Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of
Credit (the U.N. Convention), a potential fourth regime, has not been ratified by the
United States Senate and is not discussed. For the text of the U.N. Convention, see United
Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, 1995
U.N.Y.B. 1358-62; U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/48 (1995). The U.N. Convention was formulated
by the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"). UNCITRAL is an
inter-governmental technical organ of the U.N. General Assembly that assists the interna-
tional community in modernizing and harmonizing laws dealing with international trade.
Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the United Nations Convention on In-
dependent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, 30th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/431, at 1 (1996). The U.N. Convention became effective on Janu-
ary 1, 2000, the first day of the month following the expiration of one year from the deposit
of the fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. The adopting
states are Belarus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Kuwait, Panama, and Tunisia. Belarus is the only
country to adopt the Convention after it became effective. The United States has signed
the Convention but not ratified it. See United Nations Treaty Collection, http://un-
treaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterX/treaty27.asp (last vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2005).
18. See supra note 2.
19. See supra note 6. UCP 500 can be incorporated into domestic as well as interna-
tional letters of credit. See UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 1 (noting UCP 500 applies to all
letters of credit into which it is incorporated).
20. ISP 98 can be incorporated into domestic as well as international letters of credit.
See JAMES E. BYRNE, THE OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL STANDBY
PRACTICES R. 1.01(b) (Institute for Int'l Banking L. & Practice 1998) [hereinafter OFFI-
CIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98] ("A standby letter of credit or other similar undertaking, how-
ever named or described, whether for domestic or international use, may be made subject
to these Rules by express reference to them."); infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text
for the concept of a standby letter of credit.
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II. OVERVIEW OF LETFER-OF-CREDIT LAW
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY
LETTERS OF CREDIT
1. UC. C. Article 5
Letters of credit conventionally are classified as either commercial let-
ters of credit or standby letters of credit. 2 1 A commercial letter of credit
requires the issuer to pay the seller of goods upon the seller's timely pres-
entation of the documents specified in the letter of credit.2 2 The specified
documents represent the seller's performance of the agreed sale and, in
addition to the seller's draft or demand for payment, typically include at
least the seller's invoice and transportation documents indicating that the
goods have been shipped. 23 Additional documents that can be required
include a packing list, an insurance policy, an inspection certificate by an
independent testing agency, a certificate of origin, and a certificate of
shipment.24
All other letters of credit can be regarded as standbys.2 5 Standby let-
ters of credit can be used in any context, including sales, and are not
The development of ISP 98 was coordinated by the nonprofit Institute for International
Banking Law and Practice and the International Financial Services Association, an associa-
tion of the major banks issuing letters of credit. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98,
supra, at xvi. ISP 98 has been endorsed by the ICC. See id. at v (Preface by Dieter Kiefer).
Professor James E. Byrne of George Mason School of Law, the Director of the Institute of
International Banking Law and Practice, was Reporter and Chair of the Working Group
for ISP 98. See id. at 354. For more information on the Institute, see its website http://
www.iiblp.org.
21. See 1 JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETrERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND
STANDBY CREDITS 1-1 (rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter DOLAN] (discussing standard letter-of-
credit transactions).
22. Id. at 1-2 to 1-3.
23. See, e.g., S.B. Int'l, Inc. v. Union Bank of India, 783 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1989, no writ) (commercial letter of credit requiring presentation of drafts, invoices,
and bills of lading). In order to be timely, presentation must be made before both the
expiration date and any earlier presentation deadline imposed by the letter of credit. See
Banco Gen. Runinahui, S.A. v. Citibank Int'l, 97, F.3d 480, 483 (11th Cir. 1996) (letter of
credit requiring documents to be presented "no later than 15 days after shipment, but
within the validity of the credit.").
24. See, e.g., Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1535
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986) (commercial letter of credit requiring
presentation of a certification by the beneficiary that it had performed the conditions of
the letter of credit, a certification by Lloyd's of London or the shipping company that the
ship was a first class or approved non-Pakistani vessel, a certificate of West European
origin, a certificate of analysis by Lloyd's of London or another international testing
agency, a marine insurance policy, and a packing list in addition to drafts, invoices, and
bills of lading).
25. JAMES G. BARNES ET AL., THE ABCs OF THE UCC ARTICLE 5: LETTERS OF
CREDIT 1-10 (Boss ed. 1998) [hereinafter BARNES ET. AL.] (noting that, although both
standby and commercial letters of credit "provide for payment against the presentation of
specified documents," standbys do not require "a negotiable bill of lading or other trans-
port document;" also noting the varied uses of standbys, including providing cash collateral




limited to assuring payment upon the applicant's default. 26 Notwithstand-
ing these rules-of-thumb, distinguishing between commercial and standby
letters of credit can be difficult,27 but it also can be unnecessary. Article
5, for example, adopts a "one law for all letters of credit approach. '28
There are no special Article 5 rules for either commercial letters of credit
or standbys.29 Although the other letter-of-credit regimes focus on either
commercial or standby letters of credit,30 they do not contain precise
definitions. 31
2. The Other Letter-of-Credit Regimes
UCP 500 is a codification by the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) of the international standard practice of financial institutions that
regularly issue commercial letters of credit.32 UCP 500 is not law per se 33
but is enforced by courts and arbitration tribunals as part of the under-
taking of an issuer that has incorporated UCP 500 into its letter of
credit. 34 Although most appropriate for commercial letters of credit,35
with modifications, UCP 500 can be incorporated into standbys. 36
26. See id. at 7-9 (explaining that it is false to imply that a standby letter of credit is
payable only after a default or is not used in sales of goods). Nevertheless, standby letters
of credit are used frequently to assure payment in the event of the applicant's default. See,
e.g., Interfirst Bank Greenspoint v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 747 P.2d 129, 131-32
(Kan. 1987) (standby letter of credit requiring presentation of sight draft, signed certificate
that named individuals that had not performed satisfactorily under the terms of a contract
or other obligation to Interfirst Bank Greenspoint or its transferee, plus the original letter
of credit).
27. BROOKE WUNNICKE ET AL., STANDBY AND COMMERCIAL LETrERS OF CREDIT 2-
9, 2-10 (3d ed. Aspen 2000) ("The distinction between commercial and standby letters of
credit, however, has not been definitively codified.").
28. BARNES, ET AL., supra note 25, at 9 ("[T]he one law for all letters of credit ap-
proach [is] taken in UCC Article 5.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id.
30. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
31. See UCP 500, supra note 6, arts. 1-2 ( UCP 500 applies to all "documentary cred-
its," including standby letters of credit, in which it is incorporated; documentary credits and
standby letters of credit generally defined the same way); OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98,
supra note 20, R. 1.01 cmt. 3 ("no definition of a standby letter of credit is provided"); see
also id. R. 1.01 cmt. 9 (the phrase "documentary letter of credit" is avoided because it is
ambiguous).
32. See UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED, supra note 6, at III (discussing the role of the ICC
and presenting a justification for UCP 500); supra note 6 for discussion of the ICC.
33. See UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that incorporation of
the UCP is subject to national law and that courts and arbitration tribunals must resolve
conflicts with national law).
34. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bank Leumi, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 24-25
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the UCP has the force of law with respect to a letter of
credit incorporating it).
35. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, at vii ("To accurately reflect
the ... requirements of a standby, one would need to exclude, amend or adapt the majority
of the articles in the UCP.") (Preface by Gary Collyer).
36. UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 1 (stating that UCP 500 applies to any Documentary
Credits in which it is incorporated, including, to the extent applicable, standbys). See, e.g.,
E & H Partners v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 39 F. Supp. 2d 275, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(standby letter of credit incorporating UCP 500). However, careful lawyers exclude inap-
propriate UCP 500 articles from incorporation into a standby. See James E. Byrne, The
International Standby Practices (1SP98): New Rules for Standby Letters of Credit, 32 UCC
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UCP 500's focus on commercial letters of credit 37 led to ICC endorse-
ment of ISP 98 for standby letters of credit. 38 Like UCP 500, ISP 98 is
incorporated into a letter of credit and enforced as part of the issuer's
undertaking.39 ISP 98 is not designed for commercial letters of credit.
40
3. The Greater Significance of Applicant Ad Hoc Waiver for
Commercial Letters of Credit
Applicant ad hoc waiver of known documentary discrepancies occurs
most frequently with respect to commercial letters of credit. Commercial
letters of credit typically require the presentation of both a greater num-
ber of documents and more complex documents than standbys, affording
a greater opportunity for discrepancies. 41 An applicant for a commercial
letter of credit who wants the goods also has an economic incentive to
waive discrepancies,42 whereas an applicant for a standby letter of credit
may gain nothing from waiver except the obligation to reimburse the is-
suer.43 On the other hand, standby letters of credit can require the pres-
entation of complex documentation, 44 and the applicant for a standby can
L. 149, 155-58 (1999) (identifying UCP 500 articles that are "problematic" for standbys).
Byrne also considers other provisions that would be appropriate for standbys to be either
"imprecise" or to have been omitted from UCP 500. Id. at 158-62.
37. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text for the concept of a commercial let-
ter of credit.
38. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, at xvi (discussing the need for
ISP 98); see also supra note 20 for the endorsement of ISP 98 by the ICC and supra notes
21-26 and accompanying text for the concept of a standby letter of credit.
39. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 1.04(i) (explaining that,
unless the context requires otherwise or ISP 98 expressly is modified or excluded, upon
incorporation into a letter of credit, the terms and conditions of ISP 98 are part of the
issuer's agreement).
40. See id. R. 1.01(b), R. 1.01 cmt. 8 (noting that Rule 1.01(b) states that ISP 98 applies
to undertakings that expressly incorporate it "however named or described"). But see
JAMES E. BYRNE, ISP 98 & UCP 500 COMPARED R. 1.01 cmt. 5 (Institute for Int'l Banking
L. & Practice 2000) [hereinafter ISP 98 & UCP 500 COMPARED] (ISP 98 "was not designed
for commercial letters of credit.").
If the issuer of a letter of credit mistakenly incorporated both UCP 500 and ISP 98, the
result could be surprising. UCP 500 has no rule dealing with conflicting incorporations but
ISP 98 does. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 1.02(b) (ISP 98 super-
sedes conflicting rules of practice to which a standby letter of credit is subject). This care-
fully phrased statement means that incorporation of both UCP 500 and ISP 98 into a
commercial letter of credit would not result in ISP 98 superseding UCP 500. See id. R. 1.02
cmt. 6 (Rule 1.02(b) does not apply to conflicting rules applicable to a commercial letter of
credit).
41. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text for discussion of the documentation
commonly required by commercial and standby letters of credit.
42. See Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit, supra note 1, at 2515 (noting that even if
the documents suggest a default on the underlying contract, applicants for commercial let-
ters of credit "almost universally" waive documentary defects).
43. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 5.05 cmt. 1 (implying that
some standbys are default undertakings that the applicant does not want to pay and there-
fore would refuse to waive discrepancies).
44. E.g., E & H Partners v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 39 F. Supp. 2d 275, 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (a standby letter of credit obtained by a wholesaler for a domestic supplier required
the presentation of sight drafts upon the issuer accompanied by copies of commercial in-
voices, signed bills of lading, packing lists, signed purchase orders, a notification to the
applicant that the supplier was thirty days past due upon the invoices thirty days prior to a
14592005]
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have an economic incentive to waive discrepancies. In Havoco of
America, Ltd. v. Sumitomo Corp.,45 for example, Sumitomo, a sales agent
for Havoco, a buyer/reseller of coal, agreed to finance Havoco's contract
to supply coal to the TVA. 46 Sumitomo obtained standby letters of credit
designating Havoco as beneficiary that required presentation of coal in-
voices and barge bills of lading. 47 In its role as sales agent, Sumitomo had
an economic incentive to waive documentary discrepancies that did not
imperil the coal supply contract on which it earned commissions. Be-
cause applicant waivers can occur, ISP 98 deals with ad hoc waivers by
applicants for standby letters of credit.48
B. U.C.C. ARTICLE 5: KEY DEFINITIONS
Under U.C.C. Article 5, which measures time in "business days,"' 49 a
"letter of credit" is a definite undertaking by the "issuer"50 either to pay
or to deliver an item of value upon satisfaction of the documentary condi-
tions precedent to the issuer's duty to honor.51 The issuer's undertaking
draw, a signed statement by an authorized officer of the beneficiary that the commercial
invoices remained unpaid at the time of the draw, and the original standby letter of credit).
45. 971 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1992).
46. Id. at 1334.
47. See id. at 1334, 1337 (Sumitomo financed Havoco's contract to supply coal to the
TVA with monthly nonrevolving letters of credit that named Havoco as beneficiary). The
letters of credit provided for payment of Havoco upon its presentation of coal invoices and
barge bills. Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hilco, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 946, 953-54 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (the sales agency agreement required the letters of credit to provide for payment to
Havoco within seven days after presentment of coal invoices and barge bills of lading),
affd, 971 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1992). These were standby letters of credit because the bene-
ficiary was the buyer rather than the seller of the coal. A commercial letter of credit re-
quires the issuer to pay the seller upon the seller's presentation of required documents
representing performance of the agreed sale. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
The documents required to be presented by the Havoco letter of credit were far fewer than
is common with respect to commercial letters of credit. See supra notes 23-26 and accom-
panying text.
48. E.g., OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 5.05 (Issuer Request for
Applicant Waiver without Request by Presenter). Official Comment 1 explains: "This
Rule permits the issuer to seek waiver from the applicant on its own initiative similar to
UCP 500 Art. 14(c). It does not assume that all standbys are default undertakings in which
the applicant does not want to pay and will always refuse to waive discrepancies." Id. R.
5.05 cmt. 1.
49. See U.C.C. § 5-108(b) (providing that the issuer either must honor or give notice of
dishonor by the end of the "seventh business day" after the business day of receipt of the
documents).
50. Id. § 5-102(a)(9) (the "issuer" is the person that issues the letter of credit). In
order to prevent a wily creditor from depriving an individual consumer of defenses to pay-
ment by requiring the consumer to issue a letter of credit naming the creditor as benefici-
ary, undertakings by individuals with respect to personal, family or household debts do not
qualify as letters of credit. See id. § 5-102(a)(9) (providing that "issuer" does not include
an individual engaged in a consumer transaction); id. § 5-102 cmt. 5 (noting that consumers
are excluded from the definition of "issuer" in order to preserve their defenses against
creditors).
51. See id. § 5-102(a)(10) (emphasis supplied). The definition of letter of credit is one
of seven Article 5 provisions that cannot be varied by either a contrary agreement or an
incorporation by reference. See id. § 5-103(c) ("With the exception of ..., the effect of this
Article may be varied by agreement or by a provision stated or incorporated by reference
1460 [Vol. 58
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is made to the "beneficiary" 52 at the request of, or for the account of, the
"applicant. ' 53 The beneficiary or a person, typically a bank, acting for
the beneficiary that presents required documents to the issuer for honor
is the "presenter. 5
4
If the issuer and the beneficiary operate in different markets, the bene-
ficiary may want to obtain payment from a local financial institution. To
make this possible, the issuer can undertake to reimburse a designated
"nominated person" 55 in the beneficiary's market for giving value pursu-
ant to the issuer's letter of credit. A nominated person per se is not obli-
gated to give value pursuant to the issuer's letter of credit.56 But a
nominated person can become a "confirmer"5 7 by undertaking to honor a
presentation under the issuer's letter of credit and assuming obligations
to both the issuer and the beneficiary. 58 An "adviser" is another local
intermediary. At the request of the issuer, the confirmer, or another ad-
viser, an adviser either notifies or requests another adviser to notify the
in an undertaking."). For discussion of the nonvariable provisions, see Sandra Stern, Vary-
ing Article 5 of the UCC by Agreement, 114 BANKING L.J. 516, 517-21 (1997).
An attempt by the parties to vary the statutory definition of "letter of credit" by includ-
ing nondocumentary conditions of honor could disqualify the undertaking from treatment
as a letter of credit. E.g., Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publ'g Co. v. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d
1285, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (nondocumentary conditions with respect to
external facts required enforcement of an instrument as a guaranty rather than as a letter
of credit). See generally Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Essence of a Letter of Credit Under
Revised U.C.C. Article 5: Permissible and Impermissible Nondocumentary Conditions Af-
fecting Honor, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1079 (1998).
52. Under the terms of the letter of credit, the "beneficiary" is the person who is enti-
tled to have a complying presentation of documents honored. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(3)
(definition of "beneficiary").
53. The "applicant" is the person at whose request or for whose account the letter of
credit is issued. See id. § 5-102(a)(2) (definition of "applicant").
54. See id. § 5-102(a)(13) (definition of "presenter"). In DBJJJ, Inc. v. Nat'l City
Bank, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 907-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), for example, a bank presented the
documents to the issuer on the beneficiary's behalf. A nominated person that has given
value for the required documents or a person acting for the nominated person also can be
the presenter. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(13) (a nominated person that has given value or a
person acting for the nominated person can be the presenter). See infra note 55 and ac-
companying text for the concept of a nominated person.
55. See id. § 5-102(a)(11) (the issuer undertakes to reimburse a nominated person for
giving value under the letter of credit).
56. See id. § 5-107(b) ("[A] nominated person who is not a confirmer is not obligated
to honor or otherwise to give value for a presentation").
57. See id. § 5-102(a)(4) (a "confirmer" is a nominated person who undertakes to
honor a letter of credit issued by another). A confirmer must have been designated or
authorized by the issuer to give value under the issuer's letter of credit. See id. § 5-
102(a)(4) cmt. 1 (a person that agrees to confirm without the designation or authorization
of the issuer is not an Article 5 confirmer). See id. § 5-102(a)(11) (definition of "nomi-
nated person"). An unauthorized confirmer is referred to as a "silent confirmer." Dibrell
Bros. Int'l S.A. v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1575-76 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994)
(per curiam) (silent confirmation occurs when the beneficiary rather than the issuer re-
quests confirmation). A silent confirmer can have the Article 5 liability of the issuer of a
letter of credit for its own account, or, if its undertaking does not qualify as a letter of
credit, contractual liability to the beneficiary. See U.C.C. § 5-102 cmt. 1 (a silent confirmer
can be liable under either Article 5 or contract law).
58. See id. § 5-107(a) (to the extent of its confirmation, the confirmer is obligated di-
rectly on the confirmed letter of credit as though it was the issuer and also is obligated to
the issuer of the confirmed letter of credit as though the issuer were an applicant).
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beneficiary that the letter of credit has been issued, confirmed, or
amended.5 9 An adviser also can be, but need not be, a nominated person
and a confirmer. 60
The confirmation of the issuer's letter of credit by a nominated person
at the issuer's request is deemed to make the issuer an "applicant" for the
letter of credit issued by the confirmer.61 The issuer-confirmer relation-
ship accordingly is a special context in which applicant ad hoc waiver of
known documentary discrepancies could occur. In this special context,
there are two applicants that theoretically could make waivers: (1) the
applicant for the issuer's letter of credit,62 and (2) the issuer whose letter
of credit has been confirmed by the confirmer.63 However, if the appli-
cant for the issuer's letter of credit does not join the issuer in waiving
documentary discrepancies, the issuer's entitlement to reimbursement for
paying the confirmer could be jeopardized. 64 With respect to confirmed
letters of credit, the waiver of the applicant for the issuer's letter of credit
is central.65
C. THE OTHER LETER-OF-CREDIT REGIMES: KEY DEFINITIONS
The UCP 500 terms for "letter of credit" are "Documentary Credit"
and "Credit," which include both commercial and standby letters of
credit.66 UCP 500 generally uses Article 5 terminology. 67 But the roles
of adviser, issuer, nominated person, and confirmer are restricted to
"banks," 68 and time is measured in "banking days."' 69 Rule 1.01(a) states
that ISP 98 applies to performance, financial, and direct pay standbys
59. See id. § 5-102(a)(1) (definition of "adviser").
60. See Banco Nacional de Desarrollo v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 726 F.2d 87, 89-92 (3d
Cir. 1984) (advising bank acted at its peril in paying the beneficiary before presenting doc-
uments to the issuer, which justifiably dishonored).
61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Robalen, Inc. v. Generale de Banque, S.A., 1999 WL 688301, at *4(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (the issuer had waived discrepancies with respect to the first two presenta-
tions to the confirmer but not with respect to the third presentation under UCP 500).
63. See, e.g., Marino Indus. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 686 F.2d 112, 116-
18 (2d Cir. 1982) (the issuer had refused to waive late presentation, but there was a ques-
tion of fact whether the confirmer had waived it under UCP 290).
64. See U.C.C. § 5-111 cmt. 2 (improper honor may or may not damage the applicant);
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1977) (under 1962 Arti-
cle 5, the issuer could waive the expiry date of the letter of credit without the consent of
the applicant even if this jeopardized the issuer's right of reimbursement).
65. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 550 F.2d at 886-87.
66. See UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 2 (a "Documentary Credit" or a "Credit," which
can include a standby, obligates the "Issuing Bank" to pay or to accept and to pay drafts
against stipulated documents). Article 4 provides that credit operations deal with docu-
ments and not with the goods, services, or other performances to which the documents
relate. Id. art. 4.
67. See id. art. 2 (applicant & beneficiary).
68. Id. arts. 2 (issuing bank), 9(a) (nominated bank and confirming bank), & 11(a)
(advising bank).
69. Id. art. 14(d)(i) (notice of dishonor must be given no later than the "seventh bank-
ing day" following the day of receipt of the documents).
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without defining standby.70 ISP 98 follows the Article 5 approach. Issu-
ers, advisers, nominated persons, and confirmers are not confined to
banks,71 and time is measured in "business days."
72
III. AMENDING A LETTER OF CREDIT, APPLICANT
PRECLUSION TO OBJECT TO HONOR, AND
PRESENTER PRECLUSION TO OBJECT TO
DISHONOR DISTINGUISHED FROM
APPLICANT AD HOC WAIVER
Applicant ad hoc waiver of known documentary discrepancies should
be distinguished from the applicant's and the beneficiary's agreement to
amend the documentary conditions of an issued letter of credit. Inten-
tional applicant ad hoc waiver of known documentary discrepancies oc-
curs, if it does, either before or after the issuer has given notice of
dishonor and discrepancies to the presenter 73 and is limited to the single
presentation of documents.74 The applicant's and the beneficiary's agree-
ment to amend the documentary conditions of an issued letter of credit
can occur at any time and, upon becoming effective, applies to all subse-
quent documentary presentations under the letter of credit.75 Under all
three regimes, an agreement between the applicant and the beneficiary
amending the documentary conditions of an issued letter of credit does
not bind the issuer until the issuer assents.
76
Applicant ad hoc waiver of known documentary discrepancies also
should be distinguished from applicant preclusion to object to honor. In-
tentional applicant ad hoc waiver of known documentary discrepancies is
voluntary on the applicant's part and occurs, if it does, either before or
after the issuer has given notice of dishonor and discrepancies to the pre-
senter.77 Applicant preclusion to object to honor is involuntary on the
applicant's part, and occurs, if it does, after the issuer has honored a doc-
70. OMCIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 1.01(a); id. R. 1.01 cmt. 3 (stat-
ing that standby letter of credit is not defined).
71. See id. Rs. 1.09(a) (confirmer), 2.01(a) (issuer), 2.04 (nominated person), & 2.05
(advisor). ISP 98 also refers to "applicants" and "beneficiaries." Id. R. 1.09(a).
72. See id. R. 5.01(a)(i) (notice of dishonor that is given within three business days
after the business day of presentation is not unreasonable).
73. See infra notes 165-91, 213 and accompanying text.
74. See U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 7 ("Waiver of discrepancies by... an applicant in one or
more presentations does not waive similar discrepancies in a future presentation.").
75. See, e.g., Sanders-Langsam Tobacco Co. v. Chem. Bank, 224 Bankr. 1, 3-4 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1998) (letter of credit amended prior to any presentation to require presentation
of a "[p]urchase order evidencing quantities and prices of merchandise in above invoices").
76. Id. at 9-12 (the applicant's and the beneficiary's agreement to operate without
purchase orders two weeks after amending the first letter of credit to require presentation
of purchase orders was not binding upon the issuer under UCP 400). Article 5 has the
same rule. See U.C.C. § 5-106(b) (the issuer is not bound by an amendment to the issued
irrevocable letter of credit to which it has not consented). ISP 98 refers to an issuer's
expression of consent by issue of an amendment. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98,
supra note 20, R. 2.06(b)(i) ("an amendment binds the issuer when it leaves the issuer's
control").
77. See infra notes 165-91, 213 and accompanying text.
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umentary presentation and either has sought.or obtained reimbursement
from the applicant.78 If the applicant receives the presented documents
and remains silent for more than an agreed period of time or, absent of
an agreement, for an unreasonable period of time, the applicant can be
precluded from asserting that honor was improper due to documentary
discrepancies. 79 Applicant preclusion to object to honor can result from
the expiration of a deadline for objection in a reimbursement agree-
ment,80 from estoppel,81 from incorporation into a standby letter of credit
of the ISP 98 provision requiring an applicant that has been forwarded
honored documents to give notice of apparent discrepancies, 82 and from
expiration of the one-year Article 5 statute of limitations on an issuer's
liability for wrongful honor.83
Finally, ISP 98 has a special-presenter-preclusion provision that bars
litigation for wrongful dishonor. If a "presenter" 84 that has been given
notice of dishonor and discrepancies requests the issuer to ask the appli-
cant to waive the discrepancies without expressly excluding preclusion
and the issuer complies, the presenter is precluded thereafter from chal-
lenging the identified discrepancies. 8 5 This special-preclusion provision
78. James G. Barnes & James E. Bryne, Letters of Credit, 49 Bus. LAw. 1907, 1915 n.6
(1994).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1915 n.56 ("Reimbursement agreements frequently state that the applicant is
precluded from defending a claim for reimbursement unless the applicant promptly speci-
fies the discrepancies in the presentation and returns the documents to the issuer.").
81. See, e.g., Petra Int'l Banking Corp. v. First Am. Bank, 758 F. Supp. 1120, 1136-37(E.D. Va. 1991), affd per curiam sub nom. Petra Int'l Banking Corp v. Dameron Int'l, Inc.,
953 F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1992) (applicant precluded from asserting documentary discrepan-
cies after obtaining the goods with the documents, entering into a secret settlement with
the seller with respect to the inferior quality of the goods, and not challenging the issuer's
right to reimbursement until more than a year later).
82. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 5.09 (an applicant that has
been forwarded honored documents must object to honor of a noncomplying presentation
by prompt notice of facially apparent discrepancies within a time after receipt of the docu-
ments that is not unreasonable). Comment 3 suggests that notice of objection that was
given more than seven business days after the applicant received the honored documents
would be unreasonable. Id. R. 5.09 cmt. 3.
For pros and cons with respect to applicant preclusion to object to honor, compare Do-
LAN, supra note 21, at 4-120, 4-121 ("Preclusion rules should probably not apply in the
issuer/applicant setting."), with Barnes & Byrne, 1998 Cases, supra note 4, at 1903-06 (stat-
ing that ISP 98 reflects general letter-of-credit principles in precluding applicants from as-
serting discrepancies apparent upon the face of documents that have been provided to
them).
83. U.C.C. §§ 5-111(b) (the issuer is liable to the applicant for direct and incidental
damages, but not consequential damages, caused by wrongful honor), 5-115 (an action
must be commenced either within one year after the expiration of the letter of credit or
within one year after the claim accrued, whichever is later, and a claim accrues upon
breach regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach). Wrongful
honor is the issuer's honor of discrepant documents. See supra note 4.
84. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 1.09(a) (a "presenter" is
either the beneficiary, a nominated person that has given value under the letter of credit,
or a person acting for the beneficiary or the nominated person). The Article 5 definition of
"presenter" is similar. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(13).
85. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 5.06 (presenter request that
the issuer ask the applicant for a waiver). The preclusion is imposed by Rule 5.06(c)(1).
Id. R. 5.06(c)(1).
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could trap uninformed presenters and discourage offers of settlement by
wary presenters.86 ISP 98 is the only letter-of-credit regime to provide
for presenter preclusion.8
7
In sum, intentional applicant ad hoc waiver of known documentary dis-
crepancies differs from amending a letter of credit in that it is effective
with respect to the applicant without the consent of the other parties to
the letter-of-credit transaction88 and leaves the terms of the letter of
credit unaltered. On the other hand, applicant preclusion to object to
honor occurs only if the applicant has not made a prior ad hoc waiver of
discrepancies, and presenter preclusion to object to dishonor arises be-
tween the issuer and the presenter without the applicant's involvement.
IV. THE EFFECT OF LETTER-OF-CREDIT RULES ASSURING
PROMPT AND CERTAIN PAYMENT UPON THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF APPLICANT
AD HOC WAIVER
For a letter of credit to be commercially acceptable, the beneficiary
must be assured of prompt and certain payment.8 9 Several interrelated
rules, which have slightly different formulations in the three regimes, pro-
vide this assurance. These rules include: (1) the Independence Principle;
(2) the apparent facial compliance test for the adequacy of a documen-
tary presentation; and (3) the preclusion of the issuer from justifying dis-
honor with documentary discrepancies of which timely notice has not
been given.90 The first two rules increase the necessity for applicant ad
hoc waiver. On the other hand, issuer preclusion to assert documentary
discrepancies makes applicant ad hoc waiver unnecessary.
A. U.C.C. ARTICLE 5
As expressed in Article 5, the Independence Principle, which cannot be
varied by agreement, 91 severs the beneficiary's entitlement to payment by
the issuer from underlying relationships between the beneficiary, the is-
suer, and the applicant. 92 The payment obligation of the issuer to the
beneficiary is independent of the performance or the nonperformance of
86. See infra notes 308-13 and accompanying text.
87. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, at 220-21 (identifying no
equivalent rule in other letter-of-credit regimes).
88. However, the issuer has the right to refuse to waive discrepancies that the appli-
cant has waived. See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
89. BARNES ET AL., supra note 25, at 10 ("[T[he basic expectations of the marketplace
[are] that bank letters of credit will be paid against the bank's receipt of the documents
specified in the credit .... ").
90. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text (Article 5); see also infra notes 101-
28 and accompanying text (UCP 500 & ISP 98).
91. See U.C.C. § 5-103(c)-(d) (stating that the Independence Principle is protected
from variation).
92. See id. § 5-103 cmt. 1 (illustrating the Independence Principle by example: "That




any contract or arrangement underlying the letter of credit, including the
reimbursement agreement between the applicant and the issuer.93 The
beneficiary's entitlement to payment depends on the presentation of re-
quired documents that appear "on ... [their] face strictly to comply with
the terms and conditions of the letter of credit" according to the "stan-
dard practice of financial institutions that regularly issue letters of
credit."' 94 Absent a different agreement, the issuer must determine
whether the documents presented appear to comply strictly with the
terms and conditions of the letter of credit within a reasonable time, not
to exceed seven business days, following the business day of receipt of the
documents. 95 An issuer that fails to give timely notice to a presenter96 of
a documentary discrepancy is precluded from asserting it.97 Failure to
give notice of either honor or dishonor by the deadline is wrongful "silent
dishonor. '98 Statutory strict preclusion is involved. Waiver, estoppel,
and prejudicial reliance on the lack of timely notice are irrelevant. 99
93. See id. § 5-103(d). The principal Article 5 exception to the Independence Principle
is material letter-of-credit fraud. See id. § 5-109. In two other instances, the Independence
Principle is qualified to allow consideration of an underlying transaction for a specific pur-
pose: (1) breach of a statutory warranty by a beneficiary that has obtained honor, see id.§ 5-110(a); and (2) subrogation of an unreimbursed issuer that has honored a presentation,
of an applicant that has reimbursed an issuer, and of a nominated person that has given
value under a letter of credit to the rights of another to the same extent as a secondary
obligor would have been subrogated, see id. § 5-117.
94. See id. § 5-108(a), (e). Proof of material fraud or forgery with respect to a re-
quired document can justify good-faith dishonor notwithstanding the apparent facial com-
pliance of a documentary presentation. See id. § 5-109(a)(2). But see id. § 5-109(a)(1)(four classes of presenters are entitled to honor notwithstanding proof of material fraud or
forgery, e.g., a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit that had
been accepted by the issuer). However, unless the applicant obtains an injunction against
honor, notwithstanding the applicant's claim of material fraud or forgery with respect to a
required document, the issuer is free to honor a presentation in good faith, id. § 5-
109(a)(2), and in fact is more likely to honor than to dishonor. See id. § 5-109 cmt. 2(honor avoids the liability for wrongful dishonor that would arise if the issuer could not
prove material fraud or forgery of a required document in subsequent litigation).
95. See id. § 5-108(b). The seven-business-day maximum begins on the business day
following the business day of presentation and could allow eight business days overall.
Documents must be received at the place specified for presentation to activate the statu-
tory deadline. See id. cmt. 2, 6 (documents are considered received only at the place
specified for presentation).
96. See supra note 54 and accompanying text for the definition of presenter.
97. See U.C.C. § 5-108(c). On the other hand, failure to give prompt notice to the
presenter whether the required documents will be held at the presenter's disposal or re-
turned, which also is required, does not create preclusion. See id. § 5-108(b)-(c), (h) (an
issuer that has dishonored a presentation shall advise the presenter whether the documents
will be held at the disposal of the presenter or returned but failure to give this notice does
not give rise to preclusion). However, an issuer's failure to acknowledge the presenter's
right to dishonored documents with significant value could constitute conversion of the
documents under supplementary principles of tort law. See Amwest Sur. Co. v. Concord
Bank, 248 F. Supp. 2d 867, 881-83 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (granting beneficiary summary judg-
ment that issuer had converted sight draft and accompanying written certification by re-
taining the documents without notifying the beneficiary that the documents either would
be returned or held for it).
98. See U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 2 ("failure of the issuer to act" is "silent dishonor").
99. See id. § 5-108 cmt. 3 (emphasizing that the statutory preclusion is not dependent
upon principles of waiver and estoppel).
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However, there is no preclusion with respect to the forgery of a required
document, a material fraud by the beneficiary upon either the issuer or
the applicant, or the prior letter of credit expiration. 10 0 These are not
mere documentary discrepancies.
B. THE OTHER LETrER-OF-CREDIT REGIMES
UCP 500 and ISP 98 take the same general approach as Article 5. Both
recognize the Independence Principle. 10 1 The UCP 500 and ISP 98 test
for compliance is whether or not the presented documents appear on
their face to be in compliance with the letter of credit's terms and condi-
tions.10 2 Under both UCP 500 and ISP 98, the substantive test for appar-
ent facial compliance is the practice of issuers. 10 3 However, UCP 500 has
one unique per se discrepancy rule. Required documents that appear on
their face to be inconsistent with one another are deemed to be not in
compliance with the letter of credit. 1° 4 Under ISP 98, required docu-
ments are to be examined for inconsistency with each other only to the
extent required by the standby.10 5 If there is no agreed consistency re-
quirement, it suffices that every required document complies with the let-
ter of credit's terms and conditions.1 0 6 Article 5 leaves the significance of
100. See id. § 5-108(c)-(d) (providing that failure to give notice or to mention "fraud,
forgery or expiration in the notice does not preclude the issuer"); see also id. §5-108 cmt. 3.
Material fraud by the beneficiary requires that the beneficiary have no colorable right to
expect honor and no basis in fact to support a right to honor. See id. §5-109 cmt. 1 (ex-
plaining that the test is derived from decisions under the 1962 text of Article 5).
101. UCP 500 expresses the Independence Principle by declaring that "[c]redits by their
nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other contract(s) on which they may be
based "and that "[i]n Credit operations all parties concerned deal with documents, and not
with goods, services and/or other performances to which the documents may relate." UCP
500, supra note 6, arts. 3(a), 4. ISP 98 provides:
Because a standby is independent, the enforceability of an issuer's obliga-
tions under a standby does not depend on: (i) the issuer's right or ability to
obtain reimbursement from the applicant; (ii) the beneficiary's right to ob-
tain payment from the applicant; (iii) a reference in the standby to any reim-
bursement agreement or underlying transaction; or (iv) the issuer's
knowledge of performance or breach of any reimbursement agreement or
underlying transaction.
OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 1.06(c).
102. UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 13(a) (providing that required documents must appear
on their face to comply with the terms and conditions of the Credit); OFFICIAL COMMEN-
TARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 4.01(a)-(b) (explaining that apparent compliance is deter-
mined by examining the presentation on its face against the terms and conditions of the
standby).
103. UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 13(a) ("international standard banking practice"); OF-
FICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 4.01(b) ("standard standby practice").
104. UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 13(a) ("Documents which appear on their face to be
inconsistent with one another will be considered as not appearing on their face to be in
compliance .... "). But mere differences in data content do not make documents inconsis-
tent. See ISBP, supra note 6, at 15.
105. OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 4.03.
106. Id. R. 4.03 cmt. 3 ("[T]he test is whether each document relates to the standby.").
In the context of a standby letter of credit, there is not necessarily a single underlying
obligation from which an examiner can determine consistency. Id. In the relatively rare
situation in which a standby requires consistency, the standby should indicate which docu-
ments must be consistent and how consistency is to be ascertained. Id. R. 4.03 cmt. 4.
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the inconsistency of required documents to the letter of credit's terms and
the practice of issuers. 107
Absent a special agreement, both UCP 500 and ISP 98 impose a seven-
day outside deadline for giving notice of dishonor and discrepancies by
telecommunication, if available, or by other prompt and expeditious
means.10 8 An issuer is precluded from asserting a documentary discrep-
ancy that has not been the subject of timely notice.10 9 Like Article 5,
UCP 500 sub-Article 13(b) states that a reasonable time for examination
and a decision with respect to honor can be less than seven days."10 Al-
though the sub-Article 14(e) preclusion provision literally applies only to
obligations imposed by Article 14,111 DBJJJ, Inc. v. National City
Bank,1" 2 a California intermediate-appellate-court decision, reads sub-
Article 14(d) as incorporating sub-Article 13(b)'s reasonable time re-
quirement" 3 and making violation of sub-Article 13(b) a basis for sub-
Article 14(e) preclusion." 4
107. See id. at 148 (Article 5 has no rule comparable to ISP 98 Rule 4.03).
108. UCP 500, supra note 6, arts. 13(b) (providing that a reasonable time to examine
the documents in order to determine whether or not to refuse them, and to inform the
party from whom the documents had been received cannot exceed seven banking days
after the day of receuvubg the documents), 14(d) (providing that notice of refusal of the
documents must be given by telecommunication or other expeditious means no later than
the seventh banking day after the day of receipt of the documents); OFICIAL COMMEN-
TARY ISP 98, supra note 20, Rs. 5.01(a)(i) (explaining that notice of dishonor that is given
more than seven business days after the business day of receipt of the documents is
deemed to be unreasonable), 5.01(b)(i) (providing that notice of dishonor is to be given by
telecommunication or another available prompt means).
109. UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 14(d)(ii), (e) (providing that all discrepancies must be
included in timely notice or the issuer "shall be precluded"); OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP
98, supra note 20, Rs. 5.02, 5.03(a) (all discrepancies must be included in timely notice and
failure to do so "precludes assertion of that discrepancy" with respect to the presentation
involved); see also DBJJJ, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 912, 915-16 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004) (stating that, if, on remand, the beneficiary proved that the issuer had ex-
ceeded a reasonable time in deciding to dishonor, the issuer would be precluded from
claiming that the documents were discrepant under UCP 500).
110. See U.C.C. § 5-108(b) ("a reasonable time after presentation, but not beyond the
end of the seventh business day"); UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 13(b) ("a reasonable time,
not to exceed seven banking days .... ").
111. See DOLAN, supra note 21, at 6-76 to 6-77 (stating that preclusion literally applies
only to the duties in Article 14).
112. 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 904.
113. See id. at 912-13 ("If the issuing bank does not examine the documents within a
'reasonable time not to exceed seven banking days' it cannot notify the beneficiary 'with-
out delay' as required by Article 14(d)(1).").
114. See id. The court acknowledged that UCP 500 in fact was ambiguous as to whether
a violation of Article 13(b) gave rise to Article 14(e) preclusion. Its conclusion was influ-
enced by UCP 400's clear application of preclusion and the lack of evidence that UCP 500
was intended to alter the prior-preclusion rule. See id. Before the DBJJJ, Inc. decision,
some commentators had recommended that beneficiaries insert provisions in letters of
credit making violation of Article 13(b) a basis for Article 14 preclusion. See, e.g., WUN-
NICKE, supra note 27, at 5-36 ("[A] provision of the letter of credit might [so] state .... ").
Article 14's incorporation of the Article 13 reasonable time requirement into its preclu-
sion rule does not alter the sequential relationship of the two articles. The issuer has no
obligation to give notice until a reasonable time for the examination of presented docu-
ments has passed. See Banco Gen. Runinahui, S.A. v. Citibank Int'l, 97 F.3d 480, 486 (11th
Cir. 1996) (holding that the examination and notice obligations are "sequential" under
UCP 400).
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ISP 98 gives greater deference to an issuer's judgment by focusing on
whether notice of dishonor and discrepancies was unreasonable. Notice
that is given within three business days after the day of presentation is
deemed to be not unreasonable, and notice that is given after the expira-
tion of seven business days is deemed to be unreasonable. 115 Whether
notice that is given between four and seven business days is unreasonable
depends on the circumstances and banking practice. 116
UCP 500 does not explicitly exclude material fraud, forgery of a re-
quired document, or the prior expiration of the letter of credit from its
strict-preclusion rule. However, UCP 500 Article 14 is captioned "Dis-
crepant Documents" and emphasizes discrepancies "in" presented docu-
ments. 117 Material fraud, forgery of a required document, and the letter
of credit's expiration are not dealt with by Article 14 or any other aspect
of UCP 500, which does not displace their exclusion from Article 5 pre-
clusion.1 8 ISP 98 expressly excludes only notice of expiry from preclu-
sion.119 But ISP 98 does not deal with fraud and forgery 20 and likewise
does not displace their exclusion from Article 5 preclusion.12
UCP 500 preclusion has a broader scope than Article 5 and ISP 98
preclusion. UCP 500 requires that timely notice of dishonor and discrep-
ancies also advise a presenter whether the dishonored documents will be
held at the presenter's disposal or returned.' 22 An otherwise timely and
complete notice of dishonor and discrepancies is vitiated by omitting this
additional notice.' 23 Both Article 5 and ISP 98 require this notice but do
not make the failure to provide it in a timely fashion a basis for preclu-
115. OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 5.01(a)(i). ISP 98 adopted an
"unreasonable notice" test in lieu of a "reasonable notice" test in order to allow issuers the
latitude permitted by standard correspondent banking practice. See id. R. 5.01 cmt. 4
("This Rule reverses the formulation because it has been misunderstood as an invitation to
determine what is reasonable rather than, as intended, its outer limit.").
116. Id. R. 5.01 cmts. 4, 6 (unreasonableness should be determined by standard corre-
spondent banking practice and the circumstances).
117. See UCP 500, supra note 6, arts. 14(b) ("documents" on their face must comply),
14(c) ("documents appear on their face not to be in compliance"), 14(f) ("discrepanc(ies)
in the document(s)").
118. See Mid-America Tire, Inc. v. PTZ Trading Ltd., 768 N.E.2d 619, 634-37 (Ohio
2002) (holding that UCP 500 does not displace the Article 5 fraud provisions that it does
not cover). Boston Hides & Furs, Ltd. v. Sumitomo Bank, Ltd., 870 F. Supp. 1153, 1162-64
(D. Mass. 1994), limited the exclusion from preclusion to latent fraud. But Boston Hides
was decided under the 1962 version of Article 5, which contained neither an express-pre-
clusion rule nor express-exceptions from preclusion. See ABA Task Force on the Study of
Article 5, An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 45 Bus. LAW. 1521, 1601
(1990) ("The cases under the U.C.C. do not preclude the raising of objections in addition
to those originally raised unless the beneficiary can establish the affirmative defense of
waiver or estoppel .... ").
119. OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 5.04 ("Failure to give notice that
a presentation had been made after expiration does not preclude dishonor for that
reason.").
120. Id. R. 1.05(c) (defenses to honor based upon fraud, abuse, or similar matters are
left to applicable law).
121. See id.




sion.124 UCP 500 also requires that notice of a decision to dishonor be
given by telecommunication, if possible, or other expeditious means,
"without delay,"'1 25 which suggests that even notice by telecommunica-
tion could be deficient. ISP 98, on the other hand, states that notice by
available telecommunication or another means of prompt notice is per-
missible,126 which is intended to create a presumption that notice by tele-
communication is prompt.1 27  Article 5 does not address the
telecommunication issue, simply requiring that notice be given within the
deadline for a decision to dishonor.128
Under all three regimes, issuer preclusion to assert documentary dis-
crepancies makes applicant ad hoc waiver unnecessary.
V. EXPLICIT TREATMENT OF APPLICANT AD HOC WAIVER
A. U.C.C. ARTICLE 5
Article 5 authorizes the applicant to waive the statutory right to dis-
honor of a presentation of nonconforming documents through either a
prior agreement 129 or an ad hoc waiver. 130 Official Comment 1 to Section
5-108 contains examples of permissible prior agreements, including total
waiver of the statutory right to dishonor with respect to presentations
below a certain dollar amount and authorization of examination of docu-
ments exclusively by electronic or electro-optical means.' 3 '
The text of Article 5 otherwise does not address applicant ad hoc
waiver, but several Official Comments do. One Official Comment states,
"This section does not preclude the issuer from contacting the applicant
124. See U.C.C. § 5-108(b)-(c), (h) (an issuer that has dishonored shall advise the pre-
senter whether the presented documents will be held or returned but failure to give this
notice does not give rise to preclusion); OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R.
5.07 (explaining that dishonored documents must be returned, held, or disposed of as rea-
sonably instructed by the presenter but failure to include notice of disposition of the docu-
ments in notice of dishonor does not preclude the issuer from asserting defenses).
Comment 1 to Rule 5.07 explains that the documents presented under a standby typically
are not inherently valuable. Id. R. 5.07 cmt. 1. However, under tort principles supplement-
ing all three regimes, an issuer's retention of dishonored documents without giving the
required notice can constitute conversion. See supra note 97.
125. UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 14(d)(i) ("notice... by telecommunication or, if that is
not possible, by other expeditious means, without delay .... ).
126. ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 5.01(b)(i) ("notice... is to be given... by telecommuni-
cation, if available .... ).
127. See ISP 98 & UCP 500 COMPARED, supra note 40, R. 5.01 & cmt. 14 (ISP 98
"establishes a presumption that notice by telecommunication is prompt.").
128. See U.C.C. § 5-108(b)(3) (providing that notice of dishonor must be given within a
reasonable time after presentation).
129. Id. § 5-108(a) (providing for a contrary agreement).
130. See e.g. Robalen, Inc. v. Generale de Banque, S.A., 1999 WL 688301, at *2, *4
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (under UCP 500, the applicant's ad hoc waiver of failure to present a
dated On-Board bill of lading with respect to two shipments did not prevent the applicant
from refusing to waive this discrepancy with respect to the third shipment).
131. U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 1. The Official Comment adds that the illustrated agreements
do not violate the prohibition in § 5-103(c) against agreements "generally excusing liability
or generally limiting remedies for failure to perform obligations." Id.
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during its examination." 132 This is an inadequate response to decisions
like Full-Bright Industrial Co. v. Lerner Stores, Inc.,133 which held that it
was improper under UCP 400, the predecessor of UCP 500, for the issuer
to contact the applicant for a waiver of discrepancies before deciding to
reject the documents. 134 Another Official Comment says that contacting
the applicant about waiver does not affect what is a "reasonable time" for
honor or dishonor.135 This Comment reasonably rejects the holding
under UCP 400 in Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 1
36
that the issuer's inquiry whether the applicant would waive documentary
discrepancies at the request of the beneficiary could extend the issuer's
outside deadline. 137 However, the Comment goes too far in apparently
precluding an issuer from waiting for an applicant's response to a request
for a waiver within the issuer's seven-day outside deadline.1 38 Another
Official Comment addresses a conflict of authority under former Article
5,139 providing that neither the applicant's nor the issuer's ad hoc waiver
of defects in one or more presentations entitles the beneficiary to count
on waiver of the same documentary defects in later presentations.1 40 Fi-
nally, an Official Comment states that, notwithstanding the applicant's ad
hoc waiver of documentary discrepancies, the issuer can dishonor a non-
complying presentation.1 41 This Comment rejects the alternative holding
in Bombay Industries, Inc. v. Bank of New York142 that the issuer wrong-
fully had refused to honor a letter of credit following the applicant's
waiver of documentary discrepancies. 143
132. Id. § 5-108 cmt. 2.
133. 1994 WL 97361 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). For discussion of the inadequacy of this Official
Comment see infra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
134. Id. at *3 ("It is contrary to the underlying purpose of letters of credit to tie accept-
ance of the documents to the satisfaction of the buyer with the seller's performance."); see
also Kuntal, S.A. v. Bank of New York, 703 F. Supp. 312, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that
the issuer's waiting for the applicant to decide whether to waive discrepancies is "at odds
with the basic letter of credit tenet that banks deal solely in documents, not in goods",
(citing Bank of Cochin Ltd. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust, 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1543 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
135. "What is a 'reasonable time' is not extended to accommodate an issuer's procuring
a waiver from the applicant." U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 2.
136. 982 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1992).
137. Id. at 822-24 (Under UCP 400 article 16(c) and (e), the issuer's contacting the
applicant for waiver of a patent, incurable discrepancy at the request of the beneficiary
could postpone a decision with respect to dishonor until the applicant had responded or
the beneficiary had renewed its demand for honor). UCP 500 also rejects the holding. See
UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 14(c) (providing that the issuer's contacting the applicant with
respect to waiver of documentary discrepancies does not extend the issuer's deadline for
deciding whether or not to honor).
138. For discussion of the issuer's waiting for the applicant's response within the maxi-
mum seven-day deadline, see infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
139. U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 7.
140. See id. (citing conflicting cases).
141. See id. § 5-108 cmt. 7.
142. 1995 WL 808811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), rev'd, 649 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996).
143. Id. at *2-*3. The issuer's waiver of the same discrepancies in prior presentations
and the issuer's subsequent application of the value of the beneficiary's goods to the is-
suer's secured debt even though the beneficiary had not been paid for them also influenced
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1. Contacting the Applicant and Treating Different Presentations
Differently
The Official Comment stating that an issuer can contact the applicant
while presented documents are being examined 144 is vague and does not
signal clearly 145 that an issuer must be careful how it contacts the appli-
cant and what it tells the presenter about the contact. The issuer has no
need to seek the applicant's waiver with respect to presented documents
that appear on their face to comply strictly with the letter of credit.146 If
the documents do not appear to comply, the issuer should identify the
apparent discrepancies before contacting the applicant and limit the in-
quiry to the identified discrepancies. 147 The documents themselves
should be retained. Neither the originals nor copies of all the originals
should be forwarded to the applicant. 48 Premature contact or surrender
of either the original documents or copies of all the originals to the appli-
cant, coupled with the applicant's aggressively campaigning for dishonor,
could result in a factual finding that the issuer had abrogated its obliga-
tion to make an independent decision with respect to the conformity of
the documents presented.149
The issuer has no Article 5 duty to contact the applicant about
waiver 150 and need not notify the presenter that the issuer will or has
done so. 1 51 If the issuer does notify the presenter of an inquiry to the
applicant about waiver, the issuer must make clear that the issuer is not
waiving its own privilege of dishonor upon the basis of the documentary
discrepancies. In Bank of Seoul v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A.,152 the
issuer's informing the beneficiary that "we are contacting L/C appli-
cant... for approval" was held to have created a fact issue as to whether
the issuer had intended to waive its own privilege to require strictly com-
the court. Id. Although the trial court decision was reversed on appeal, see supra note 142,
the trial judge eventually had his way. In Bombay Indus., Inc. v. Bank of New York, 1997
WL 860671, at *1.4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997), the trial judge held that the issuer had failed to
give timely notice of dishonor and discrepancies and was precluded by UCP 500 from
dishonoring.
144. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
145. The Official Comment adds without elaboration, "however, the decision to honor
rests with the issuer." U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 2.
146. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
147. See Gerald T. McLaughlin & Neil B. Cohen, Banks and Letters of Credit, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 31, 2000, B4, col. 1 (in approaching the applicant for a waiver of documentary
discrepancies, the issuer should inform the applicant in writing of the discrepancies that
have been identified and retain the documents).
148. See id.
149. Compare E & H Partners v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 39 F. Supp. 2d 275, 284-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (alternative holding) (issuer estopped to assert documentary discrepancies
for allowing the applicant to play an active part in the issuer's decision to dishonor), with
Western Int'l Forest Prods., Inc. v. Shinhan Bank, 860 F. Supp. 151, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(after determining that a documentary presentation is nonconforming, the issuer can con-
sult the applicant with or without the beneficiary's request to do so).
150. U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 2 (stating that the issuer has no duty to seek a waiver from the
applicant).
151. See id.
152. 630 N.Y.S.2d 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
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plying documents. 153 The issuer can avoid waiver of its privilege to dis-
honor either by not notifying the presenter of contact with the applicant
about waiver or by coupling notice to the presenter with explicit notice
that the issuer will make an independent decision about waiver. 154 How-
ever, reservation of the insurer's rights is not notice of dishonor, and the
issuer will be precluded from asserting documentary discrepancies if
timely notice of dishonor and discrepancies is not given. 155 Indeed, the
Fifth Circuit decision in Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of
China156 indicates that including notice that the applicant is being con-
tacted in what otherwise purports to be a notice of dishonor can create
ambiguity that renders the notice of dishonor ineffective. In affirming
the district court's conclusion that the issuer had not given timely notice
of dishonor, the Fifth Circuit panel commented:
We find ample evidence supporting the district court's decision. The
court's determination that the August 11 telex did not reject the let-
ter of credit [sic] is based primarily on the Bank of China's offer to
obtain waiver from [the purchaser]. The offer to solicit waiver, the
district court reasoned, suggests that the documents had not in fact
been refused but might be accepted after consultation with [the
purchaser]. 157
The Official Comment stating that the applicant's or the issuer's ad hoc
waiver of defects in one or more presentations does not entitle the bene-
ficiary to the same waiver in later presentations 158 derives from the uni-
queness of each presentation-each presentation involves different
documents, different goods, a different timeline, and, frequently, a differ-
ent document checker.159 If a single letter of credit provides for multiple
presentations of documents, the applicant's willingness to waive the same
153. Id. at 521-22 (trial court properly denied issuer's motion for summary judgment
due to fact question with respect to waiver).
154. See James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, Letters of Credit: 1995 Cases, 51 Bus.
LAW. 1417, 1420 (1996) (summarizing the Bank of Seoul case and observing that cautious
banks either may want to disclaim waiver in notifying beneficiaries or simply cease notify-
ing beneficiaries).
155. See Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 288 F.3d 262, 265-66 (5th
Cir. 2002) (issuer's telex to presenting bank listing seven documentary discrepancies and
stating, "We are contacting the applicant for acceptance of the relative discrepancy [sic]"
was not notice of dishonor under UCP 500).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 266; see Paul S. Turner, Notices of Discrepancy and Requests for Waiver
Under UCP 500, 10 DCINSIGHr 5, 6 (ICC July/September 2004) [hereinafter Turner, No-
tices of Discrepancy] ("It is not possible to word the notice in a manner that contemplates
the waiver and does not thereby, as the court in Voest Alpine stated, leave open the possi-
bility that the allegedly discrepant documents might have been accepted at a future date.").
158. U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 7.
159. This result has been referred to as an application of the Independence Principle.
See McLaughlin, The Independence Principle, supra note 4, at 546-48 (stating that the irrel-
evancy of applicant and issuer waivers under prior letters of credit is an application of the
Independence Principle). However, the traditional Independence Principle makes irrele-
vant transactions underlying the letter of credit. See U.C.C. § 5-103(d) (providing that the
obligations of the issuer to the beneficiary and a nominated person are independent of




discrepancy with respect to the initial presentations does not obligate the
applicant to continue making the waiver. 160 In Robalen v. Generale de
Banque, S.A., 16 1 for example, the applicant's and the issuer's waiver of
the failure to date "On Board" stamps on bills of lading with respect to
two shipments did not preclude the issuer from refusing to waive the re-
quired dated "On Board" stamp for the third shipment.162 A fortiori, a
waiver of a documentary discrepancy in a presentation under one letter
of credit gives the beneficiary no reason to rely on waiver of the same
discrepancy under another letter of credit involving the same parties.1 63
Nevertheless, in honoring a presentation of documents notwithstanding
identified discrepancies, the careful issuer notifies the presenter that the
discrepancies may not be waived in the future.164
2. A Reasonable Time for Honor or Dishonor
In 1998, the International Financial Services Association (IFSA), an
association of banks and other financial institutions that process interna-
tional transactions, 165 approved a Statement of Practice under UCP 500
concerning a reasonable time for examination and notice of dishonor.166
The Statement of Practice states that issuing banks consider three bank-
ing days a "safe harbor" period for examining presented documents, pre-
paring and reviewing a notice of dishonor, and giving expeditious notice
of dishonor and discrepancies.1 67 Moreover, if the applicant has been
160. Robalen v. Generale de Banque, S.A., No. 97 Civ. 0887 (TPG), 1999 WL 688301,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
161. Id.
162. Id. at *3-4 (granting issuer summary judgment in beneficiary's action for wrongful
dishonor under UCP 500).
163. See N. Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Chiao Tung Bank, No. 95 Civ. 5189 (LBS),
1997 WL 193197 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A nominated person that had made a discrepant pres-
entation sued the applicant for unjust enrichment asserting that the same documentary
discrepancy had existed in forty prior transactions and either had been waived or cured.
The court responded that the sophisticated parties to letter-of-credit transactions are aware
of the rule of strict compliance and should not be allowed to recover without either appar-
ent strict compliance or a waiver with respect to the specific presentation. See id. at *1, *6-
7.
164. See, e.g., Pro-Fab, Inc. v. Vipa, Inc., 772 F.2d 847, 850, 852 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding
that, although the applicant had waived discrepancies with respect to three shipments, the
issuer had accompanied its checks with the statement that payment was being made not-
withstanding the listed documentary discrepancies; and was not precluded from dishonor-
ing with respect to a fourth shipment after the applicant refused to waive discrepancies
with respect to the fourth shipment).
165. About IFSA, http://www.ifsaonline.org/03-content/0305 about/030500_about_
main.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2005) (explaining that the IFSA is the only organization in
the world dedicated to the international processing areas of banks and other financial insti-
tutions). The IFSA participated in the development of ISP 98. See supra note 20.
166. IFSA, Reasonable Time for Examination & Notice of Dishonor, Statement of Prac-
tice, LC Rules & Laws Critical Texts 91 (2d ed. Institute for Int'l Banking L. & Practice
2002) [hereinafter Statement of Practice, LC Rules & Laws] (the Statement of Practice was
approved by the IFSA Board of Directors on March 20, 1998).
167. See id. at 93-94 (Statement of Practice 2 and 3). ISP 98 explicitly adopts this three-
day safe harbor. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 5.01(a)(i) (explain-
ing that notice given within three business days is deemed to be not unreasonable), which
also existed under the 1962 version of Article 5. See James G. Barnes, Nonconforming
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contacted for a waiver, the deadline for giving notice of dishonor is ex-
tended to the seventh banking day after the presentation of the docu-
ments, unless the applicant communicates its refusal to waive more
quickly or the issuer decides to dishonor irrespective of the applicant's
decision. 168 The Statement of Practice has not been endorsed by the
ICC.169
DBJJJ, Inc. v. National City Bank170 involved two commercial letters
of credit that incorporated UCP 500 and were payable to the same bene-
ficiary. The issuer had inquired whether the applicant would waive dis-
crepancies in the presentations under both letters of credit. Presentation
had been made upon one letter of credit's expiration date and three days
before the other's expiration date. 171 On the seventh banking day after
the banking day of presentation, after both letters of credit had expired,
the applicant had refused to waive the discrepancies. 172 The issuer had
given same-day notice of dishonor and discrepancies.
173
A California intermediate-appellate court reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to the issuer for acting in accordance with the
Statement of Practice. 174 To the extent that the Statement of Practice
175
indicated that it always was reasonable to take seven banking days to
dishonor when the applicant had been approached for a waiver, the inter-
mediate-appellate court considered the Statement of Practice to be inva-
lid under both UCP 500 and Article 5.176 On the other hand, denial of
summary judgment to the beneficiary was affirmed.1 77 The beneficiary
had made conclusory arguments rather than presenting uncontested facts
establishing that the issuer's notices of dishonor and discrepancies had
Presentations Under Letters of Credit: Preclusion and Final Payment, 56 BROOK. L. REV.
103, 104 (1990) (noting that under 1962 Article 5, dishonor is deemed to occur after three
banking days).
168. Statement of Practice, LC Rules & Laws, supra note 166, at 92.
169. See ISBP, supra note 6. The ISBP, a compilation of international standard bank-
ing practice under UCP 500 approved by the ICC and published in 2003, does not deal with
the deadline for notice of dishonor and discrepancies. See id.
170. 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
171. See id. at 907-08 (the expiration date of letter of credit No. 091 was December 14,
2001 and the issuer acknowledged receiving the presented documents on December 11,
2001). Presentation shortly before the letter of credit's expiration date is not best practice
but occurs with some frequency.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 907-08.
174. The trial court had concluded that "[d]efendant [Bank] had until the close of busi-
ness on the seventh banking day following its receipt of Plaintiffs claim and supporting
documents ... to send its Advice of Rejection . I..." Id  at 908.
175. The Statement of Practice considered by the court had been two pages of the
Statement adopted by the U.S. Council on International Banking. Id. at 911 ("Bank cites a
two-page excerpt from an article by the U.S. Council on International Banking .... ). The
U.S. Council on International Banking is the former name of the IFSA. Statement of
Practice, LC Rules & Laws, supra note 166, at 91 (the IFSA was formerly the USCIB).
176. DBJJJ, Inc., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 912 ("Bank's claim was that seven banking days is
always reasonable where a bank seeks a waiver from an applicant, an incorrect
argument.").
177. Id. at 912-14.
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been too late. 178 The case was remanded for a trial on the timeliness of
the issuer's notices. 179 The DBJJJ, Inc. case raises several questions, in-
cluding: (1) is the Statement of Practice in fact inconsistent with UCP 500
and Article 5, and (2) what is likely to happen on remand of the case?
The Statement of Practice does not say that it always is reasonable to
take seven banking days to dishonor when the applicant has been ap-
proached for a waiver. There are two express exceptions: (1) the appli-
cant's prompt communication of a refusal to waive and (2) the issuer's
decision to dishonor without regard to what the applicant does. 180 But
both of these express exceptions were irrelevant in DBJJJ, Inc. The ap-
plicant did not waive promptly, and the issuer waited for the applicant's
decision. 181 Because the express exceptions were not applicable, the is-
suer in DBJJJ, Inc. complied with the Statement of Practice in giving the
applicant a "refusal date" that was the seventh banking day after the
banking day of presentment. 182 But the issuer's using the latest possible
refusal date as provided by the Statement of Practice in and of itself could
have delayed the applicant's response and, for that reason, was inconsis-
tent with the UCP 500 sub-Article 13(b) requirement that the issuer de-
cide about dishonor within a "reasonable time.' 83 The Statement of
Practice is not consistent with sub-Article 13(b). But Article 5 is a differ-
ent story.
There is no Article 5 provision on point. The alleged inconsistency was
based on the Article 5 Official Comment stating that a reasonable time
for deciding about honor or dishonor "is not extended to accommodate
an issuer's procuring a waiver from the applicant.' 8 4 This Official Com-
ment makes sense with respect to the seven-day outside deadline for a
decision. The 1995 revision of Article 5 extended the issuer's outside stat-
178. Id. ("There are no facts in Seller's separate statement in support of its motion for
summary judgment relevant to this issue .... A mere description of the rule of preclusion
is insufficient.").
179. Id. at 915-16 ("If, upon remand, Seller establishes that Bank violated Article 13(b),
Bank would be precluded from claiming that the documents are not in compliance with the
terms of the credit.").
180. Statement of Practice, LC Rules & Laws, supra note 166, at 92 (noting that the
time for giving notice is earlier than the seventh banking day if the applicant refuses to
waive promptly or the issuer decides to dishonor at an earlier date, even if the applicant
waives). The express exception for the issuer's decision to dishonor, even if the applicant
waives, covers both situations in which the applicant waives promptly but the issuer refuses
to waive and situations in which the issuer refuses to waive without waiting for the appli-
cant's decision. See id.
181. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
182. See Statement of Practice, LC Rules & Laws, supra note 166, at 92 ("the time for
giving notice to the presenter runs to the close of the seventh banking day after presenta-
tion, unless ... [the exceptions apply] .... ").
183. See DBJJJ, Inc., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 910 ("By giving no meaning to the phrase
'reasonable time,' Bank's argument is inconsistent with the plain language of Article
13(b).").
184. The court stated, "Bank's argument also ignores the comment to the California
Uniform Commercial Code section 5108 .... " Id. at 911.
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utory deadline from three to seven business days.'8 5 An additional open-
ended extension is unnecessary. 186 However, the Official Comment
should not be read to preclude the issuer's delaying a final decision while
the applicant is considering waiver before the expiration of the seven-
business-day outside deadline.
187
The Official Comment refers to UCP 500 sub-Article 14(c) for the pro-
position that "[w]hat is a 'reasonable time' is not extended to accommo-
date an issuer's procuring a waiver from the applicant."' 88 However, sub-
Article 14(c) merely states that approaching the applicant for a waiver
"does not ... extend the period mentioned in sub-Article 13(b). 1 89 The
period mentioned in sub-Article 13(b) is "a reasonable time, not to ex-
ceed seven banking days following the day of receipt of the documents, to
examine the documents and determine whether to take up or refuse the
documents and to inform the party from which it received the documents
accordingly." 190 Sub-Article 13(b) does not state, as the Article 5 Official
Comment implies, that the issuer's having approached the applicant for a
waiver cannot be a factor in what is a reasonable time for notice of dis-
honor within the seven-day outside deadline. Indeed, the Statement of
Practice's existence indicates that issuers consider that a request to the
applicant for a waiver can extend the time for deciding upon dishonor
within this period. 191
The DBJJJ, Inc. case was remanded for a factual determination as to
whether the issuer had taken too long to dishonor.1 92 In contacting the
applicant about both letters of credit, the issuer had designated the sev-
enth banking day following presentation as the "refusal date," adding,
"[p]lease contact us immediately with your waiver of discrepancies or
other instructions."1 93 The justification for denying summary judgment
to the issuer with respect to both letters of credit was that, by responding
on the designated "refusal date," the applicant appeared to have inter-
preted the issuer's request for a waiver as not asking for a response
before the "refusal date. ' 194 If, on remand, it is determined that the is-
185. Compare U.C.C. § 5-108(b) ("not beyond the end of the seventh business day of
the issuer after the day of its receipt of the documents"), with 1962 U.C.C. § 5-112(1)(a)
(issuer can "defer honor until the close of the third banking day following receipt of the
documents").
186. See Kuntal, S.A. v. Bank of N.Y., 703 F. Supp. 312, 313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (the
issuer failed to justify the applicant's taking nine full days to reject a waiver under UCP
400).
187. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
188. U.C.C. § 5-108 cmt. 2.
189. UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 14(c).
190. Id. art. 13(b).
191. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. However, the Statement of Practice
presently does not conform to UCP 500. See supra notes 180-83 and infra notes 196-203
and accompanying text.
192. DBJJJ, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 915-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
("If, upon remand, Seller establishes that Bank violated Article 13(b), Bank would be pre-
cluded from claiming the documents are not in compliance with the terms of the credit.").
193. Id. at 907-08.
194. Id. at 910-12.
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suer's designated "refusal date" had caused the applicant to delay its re-
sponse, the issuer could not justify its own delay with delay by the
applicant that the issuer had caused. Preclusion would be imposed with
respect to both letters of credit. 195
How should the Statement of Practice be reconciled with sub-Article
13(b)? If the Statement of Practice had directed the issuer in the DBJJJ,
Inc. case to urge the applicant to respond as soon as possible without
designating a "refusal date, '196 the issuer's notice itself could not have
been the cause of delay. But the Statement of Practice also should deal
with the issuer's awareness that a presentation has been made shortly
before the letter of credit's expiration date. All well-drafted letters of
credit have expiration dates. 197 The problem is recurrent.
A presenter's cure of a defective documentary presentation makes ap-
plicant waiver unnecessary. By requiring the issuer to decide whether to
dishonor within a reasonable time and to list all the justifications in the
notice of dishonor, 198 the UCP 500 preclusion rule facilitates cure by
presenters. 199 For presentations shortly before a letter of credit's expira-
tion date, the time for cure is short. The issuer's awareness of an immi-
nent expiration date does not require the issuer to rush the examination
of presented documents, 200 and the issuer is free to contact the applicant
195. UCP preclusion is automatic and absolute. A presenter's lacked prejudicial reli-
ance upon unreasonably delayed dishonor is irrelevant. See James E. Byrne, Letters of
Credit, 43 Bus. LAW. 1353, 1370-71 (1988) (discussing the preclusion rule of UCP 400). It
consequently is irrelevant that the presenter would have been unable to cure the defective
presentation made on the expiration date of one letter of credit if timely notice had been
given. See id. (stating that it is a misunderstanding to consider that UCP preclusion is
dependent upon the ability to cure documentary defects).
196. If the references to the "refusal date" had been deleted, the notices in DBJJJ, Inc.
would have sufficed. The issuer had urged, "Please contact us immediately with your
waiver of discrepancies or other instructions." See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
197. See 12 CFR § 7.1016(b)(iii) (2005) (explaining that, as a safe and sound banking
practice, the Comptroller of the Currency considers that letters of credit issued by national
banks either should have a limited duration, permit termination by the issuer, or entitle theissuer to cash collateral from the applicant upon demand); see also U.C.C. § 5-106(c) (pro-
viding that a letter of credit without a stated expiration date expires either one year after
the stated date of issue, or, if there is no stated date of issue, one year after the date of
issue). If a letter of credit requires that documents be presented before its expiration date,
a presentation shortly before the document presentation date is the functional equivalent
of a presentation shortly before the expiration date. See, e.g., Banco Gen. Runinahui, S.A.
v. Citibank Int'l, 97 F.3d 480, 483 (11th Cir. 1996) (letter of credit requiring documents to
be presented "no later than 15 days after shipment, but within the validity of the credit.").
198. See UCP 500, supra note 6, arts. 13(b) (providing that a decision about dishonor
must be made in a "reasonable time, not to exceed seven banking days .... ), 14(d)(ii)("notice must state all discrepancies in respect of which the bank refuses the
documents .... ).
199. See, e.g., Offshore Trading Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Fort Scott, 650 F. Supp.
1487, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987) (in discussing the UCP 400 preclusion rule the court com-
mented, "Without notice of the discrepancies, the beneficiary may be unable to present
conforming documents.").
200. See Banco Gen. Runinahui, S.A., 97 F.3d at 487 (holding that the presentation of
documents the day before the document presentation deadline imposed by the letter of
credit did not compel any conclusion as to whether the issuer had completed examination
of the documents within a reasonable time).
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about waiver of identified discrepancies. 20 1 But, in view of the issuer's
awareness of the impending expiration date, it is not reasonable under
UCP 500 sub-Article 13(b) for the inquiry to the applicant to justify delay
in notice of dishonor.20 2 Prompt notice of dishonor should be given.
203
In order to conform to UCP 500, the Statement of Practice should have
an additional express exception for discrepancies that are identified in a
normal examination when the issuer is aware that the letter of credit is
about to expire.
The DBJJJ, Inc. court explained 20 4 that its interpretation of sub-Article
13(b) had relied upon an ICC 1993 Publication entitled UCP 500 & 400
Compared.205 But sub-Article 13(b) requires a decision with respect to
honor and dishonor within a "reasonable time. ' 20 6 Sub-Article 13(b)'s
plain wording indicates that the issuer may have acted unreasonably by
not requesting that the applicant respond before the last possible day.
20 7
Moreover, the ICC publication does not explore the effect of the issuer's
contacting the applicant upon the duration of the issuer's reasonable time
to respond to presented documents, merely cryptically observing that:
"Still, this sequence [contacting the applicant for a waiver] requires the
Issuing Bank to exercise a reasonable time not to exceed the seven bank-
ing days allowed by UCP 500 Article 13(b), for taking up or refusing the
document(s)."208
The ICC publication also flatly asserts that the issuer cannot approach
the applicant for a waiver until the issuer has decided to refuse the dis-
201. See UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 14(c) (the issuer has discretion with respect to
contacting the applicant about discrepancies).
202. See Hellenic Republic v. Standard Chartered Bank, 631 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321-22
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (under UCP 400, the court commented, "the expiration date of a
letter of credit is a relevant factor in determining whether there was unreasonable delay in
providing notice of dishonor ...."); see also Datapoint Corp. v. M & I Bank of Hilldale,
665 F. Supp. 722, 727 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (holding that mailing notice of dishonor and the
presented documents in the afternoon preceding the last day for presentation was unrea-
sonable as a matter of law under UCP 400). In the DBJJJ, Inc. case, the court rejected the
beneficiary's contention that UCP 500 always requires the issuer to give notice of dishonor
to the beneficiary at the same time that the applicant is approached for a waiver. DBJJJ,
Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 913-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("That argument
is better addressed to the International Chamber of Commerce."). However, the benefici-
ary had argued for a nonexistent general issuer obligation to notify the beneficiary and the
applicant at the same time. Sub-Article 13(b) imposes that obligation only when documen-
tary discrepancies are identified by a normal examination shortly before the expiration
date of the letter of credit, and the issuer is aware of the imminent expiration date. See id.
On the other hand, if the issuer is unaware of the impending expiration date, sub-Article
13(b) would not require prompt notice of dishonor. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98,
supra note 20, R. 5.01 cmt. 7 (noting reasons that an issuer that is not advised of impending
expiration by the presenter could be unaware of it).
203. Whether or not the identified discrepancies could be cured is irrelevant. See
Toyota Tsusho Corp. v. Comerica Bank, 929 F. Supp. 1065, 1073-74 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(UCP 400 preclusion is not dependent upon the beneficiary's proof of either detrimental
reliance or an ability to cure defects); see also supra note 195.
204. DBJJJ, Inc., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 911 n.5 ("We rely heavily on the publication....").
205. See supra note 6.
206. UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 13(b).
207. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
208. See UCP 500 & 400 COMPARED, supra note 6, at 47.
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crepant documents.2 09 If a decision to refuse the documents was a pre-
requisite to asking the applicant about waiver, the issuer would be
obligated by UCP 500 sub-Article 14(d)(i) to give immediate notice of
dishonor and discrepancies to the presenter in conjunction with the re-
quest to the applicant. 210 But the ICC publication misstates the sub-Arti-
cle 14(c) prerequisite to contacting the applicant, which is that "the
documents appear on their face not to be in compliance with the terms
and conditions of the Credit. '211 Under UCP 500, identifying discrepan-
cies and refusing to accept documents are distinct actions, and the former
does not trigger an obligation to give immediate notice of dishonor and
discrepancies. 212
Nevertheless, the issuer cannot control when the applicant will respond
to a waiver request. To avoid preclusion, the issuer must dishonor before
a reasonable time to do so has expired. But the including special provi-
sions in the issuer's letter of credit can revive the transaction after the
notice of dishonor. If the applicant belatedly waives and the issuer re-
tains the presented documents and also is willing to waive, special letter-
of-credit provisions can authorize the issuer to revoke both timely notice
of dishonor and discrepancies and timely notice that the presented docu-
ments are being held for the presenter. 213
3. The Issuer's Not Being Bound by the Applicant's Waiver of
Discrepancies
a. General Principles
The Official Comment stating that the issuer can dishonor on the basis
of documentary discrepancies that the applicant has waived2 14 reflects the
Independence Principle. The issuer's rights and obligations to the benefi-
ciary are independent of both arrangements between the issuer and the
applicant and arrangements between the applicant and the beneficiary.2 15
A waiver of documentary discrepancies by the applicant does not bind an
issuer that has not agreed to be bound by the applicant's waiver.216
209. See id. ("The approach to the Applicant must be made solely to obtain his waiver
once the Issuing Bank decides to refuse the discrepant documents.").
210. See UCP 500, supra note 6, art. 14(d)(i) ("If the Issuing Bank ... decides to refuse
the documents, it must give notice ... without delay ... .
211. See id. art. 14(c).
212. See DBJJJ, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 914-15 ("[T]he identifica-
tion of discrepancies is separate from the refusal to take up the documents.").
213. See Turner, Notices of Discrepancy, supra note 157, at 6 (stating that letter of creditprovisions should be effective to authorize revocation of both notice of dishonor and no-
tice that the presented documents are being held for the presenter).
214. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
215. U.C.C. § 5-103(d) ("Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary ... are
independent of ... arrangements between the issuer and the applicant and between the
applicant and the beneficiary.").
216. See Mueller Co. v. S. Shore Bank, 991 F.2d 14, 17 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that,
under UCP 400, it was not bad faith for the issuer to dishonor discrepant documents even
though the applicant had expressed an initial willingness to waive the discrepancies); see
also Win Spark Trading Co. v. Century Bus. Credit Corp., 2002 WL 1343763, at *1(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (mem.), affid sub. nom. Win Spark Trading Co. v. Periscope Sportswear,
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The issuer is liable to the applicant for damage caused by the honor of
discrepant documents.2 17 The applicant's ad hoc waiver of documentary
discrepancies confirms the issuer's entitlement to reimbursement for hon-
oring discrepant documents but not necessarily the issuer's ability to ob-
tain actual reimbursement. The applicant's weak financial condition
could make the issuer's unsecured right to reimbursement meaning-
less.218 Moreover, even a fully secured right of reimbursement would not
compel the issuer to waive discrepancies that the applicant has waived.
Secured transaction paperwork typically describes the secured obligation
as everything that the debtor owes to the secured party.219 If this type of
security agreement is used for collateral fully securing the issuer's right of
reimbursement, the collateral also is available to satisfy the applicant's
other mature obligations to the issuer.
A financial institution typically issues a letter of credit at the request of
an applicant with whom the financial institution has an ongoing financial
relationship.220 The applicant's waiver of documentary discrepancies
with respect to a substantial letter of credit with a fully secured right of
reimbursement could lead the issuer to review its overall relationship
with the applicant. 221 If the issuer elected to terminate that overall rela-
tionship by calling its loans, the issuer would be free to refuse to waive
the documentary discrepancies that the applicant had waived and to ap-
ply the collateral securing the issuer's right of reimbursement to the ap-
plicant's other mature secured obligations.
It violates the Independence Principle for the issuer to consider the
applicant's financial strength and viability in evaluating the apparent fa-
cial conformity of presented documents.222 But it is consistent with the
Independence Principle for the issuer to consider the applicant's financial
Inc., No. 2-7810, 2003 WL 21024943 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that, unless the applicant had
actual or apparent authority to act for the issuer, the applicant's telling the beneficiary that
strict compliance would be waived would not bind the issuer). But see Marsala Int'l Trad-
ing Co. v. Comerica Bank, Inc., 976 P.2d 275, 279-80 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that,
under UCP 500, after the applicant has waived documentary discrepancies, the issuer must
make payment). The Marsala case failed to consider the Independence Principle and is
incorrect. See McLaughlin & Cohen, supra note 147 (noting that Marsala "seems" to over-
look the Independence Principle and "seems incorrect").
217. See U.C.C. § 5-111 cmt. 2 (explaining that wrongful honor may or may not damage
the applicant); DOLAN, supra note 21, & 9.03[1][a] (stating that the credit application is an
ordinary contract that is not subject to the strict compliance test). See supra note 4 for a
discussion of the damages that the applicant can recover from the issuer.
218. See Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 881, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (ap-
plicant went into bankruptcy after waiving documentary discrepancies).
219. See 2004 Official Text of the U.C.C. with Comments, Selected Commercial Stat-
utes § 9-204(c) (West Abridged ed. 2004) (collateral can secure "future advances or other
value, whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment").
220. See, e.g., Lectrodryer, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882 (the applicant was one of the issuer's
largest customers).
221. See Barnes & Byrne, 1998 Cases, supra note 4, at 1890 ("Discretionary waiver by
the issuer depends on the issuer assuring itself of reimbursement. Typically, this will in-
volve a new credit assessment .... ").
222. See U.C.C. § 5-103(d) ("Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary ... are
independent of ... contracts or arrangements between the issuer and the applicant .. ");
McLaughlin, The Independence Principle, supra note 4, at 509 (under the Independence
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strength and viability in deciding whether to waive documentary discrep-
ancies.223 The Independence Principle has fulfilled its function after the
presented documents have been reviewed on their face and found want-
ing. The beneficiary only can benefit from the issuer's consideration of
extrinsic facts in deciding whether the beneficiary should be allowed bet-
ter rights than justified by the documents presented.
b. The California Lectrodryer Case
The California case of Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank224 may appear to be
inconsistent with this analysis. Lectrodryer, a Kentucky company, sold a
molecular sieve dryer used in refining oil into gasoline for $493,000 to
JDP, a California exporter of industrial equipment.2 25 Lectrodryer
shipped the machinery to JDP without requiring prepayment. 226 JDP re-
sold the sieve dryer for $601,701 and delivered it to Dae Ahn, a South
Korean oil refinery.227
JDP had been one of the largest customers of SeoulBank's Los Ange-
les office.228 By late 1995, SeoulBank extended a $2,000,000 credit line
and made an additional $380,000 loan to JDP, and JDP agreed to have
SeoulBank issue its letters of credit.2 29 When JDP applied for a $493,000
letter of credit to pay Lectrodryer, SeoulBank conditioned issue of the
letter of credit upon JDP's making a $493,000 payment to the bank.230
JDP wrote three corporate checks to SeoulBank, totaling approximately
$494,000, and SeoulBank had issued the $493,000 letter of credit designat-
ing Lectrodryer as beneficiary. 231 When two of JDP's checks totaling
$492,983 were dishonored, JDP replaced the dishonored checks with
$492,983 in cashier's checks purchased with a payment for the sieve dryer
by Dae Ahn. 232
Notwithstanding JDP's ad hoc waiver of the discrepancies, SeoulBank
rejected Lectrodryer's discrepant presentation, which contained a bill of
Principle, an issuer can not dishonor "simply because" the applicant is insolvent or other-
wise unable to reimburse the issuer).
223. See Gerald T. McLaughlin & Neil B. Cohen, Letter-of-Credit Disputes, NAT'L L.J.,
June 26, 2000, B6, col. 1 (noting that, if the applicant is about to file bankruptcy, the issuer
might insist upon strict documentary compliance despite the applicant's waiver).
224. 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 881.
225. Id. at 882.
226. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 881(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (No. B125737) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief] (the equip-
ment had been delivered to JDP prior to Lectrodryer's making a presentation under
SeoulBank's letter of credit).
227. See Lectrodryer, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882; see Respondent's Brief and Opening Brief
in Cross-Appeal at *8, Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)(No. B125737) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief] (Lectrodryer personnel had traveled to
South Korea to supervise installation of the equipment).
228. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 227, at 1 (JDP was one of the largest customers
of the Los Angeles office).
229. See id. at 8-9.
230. See id. at 10-11.
231. See id. at 11.
232. See id. at 12 (detailing financial transactions).
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lading showing shipment of the sieve dryer from Kentucky to New York
rather than the required combined bills of lading for shipment from Ken-
tucky to New York and then to Korea. 233 The letter of credit expired
without having been honored. 234 SeoulBank used JDP's payment on the
letter of credit to reduce JDP's outstanding loans. 235 JDP eventually en-
tered bankruptcy, leaving Lectrodryer unpaid. 236
Lectrodryer sued SeoulBank for unjust enrichment 237 and obtained a
$493,000 general jury verdict that was affirmed on appeal.238 The Califor-
nia intermediate-appellate court held that the jury reasonably could have
found that JDP had prepaid the letter of credit and that SeoulBank had
been unjustly enriched by retention of this prepayment after the letter of
credit had expired without having been honored. 239 The court alterna-
tively held that the jury reasonably could have found either that
SeoulBank wrongfully had dishonored after waiving the documentary
discrepancies or that SeoulBank had misled JDP into believing that the
February 21, 1996 expiration date letter of credit would be extended until
JDP's credit line had expired on February 28, 1996 and no longer could
be used to pay Lectrodryer. 240
These holdings were derived from an unnecessary concession and fail-
ures of proof by SeoulBank. SeoulBank denied that the letter of credit
had been prepaid but had not disputed that a prepaid letter of credit's
expiration would obligate the issuer to refund the prepayment. 241 In view
of the jury's determination that the letter of credit had been prepaid, this
concession had foreclosed a setoff defense by SeoulBank 242 and also
could have been construed as a tacit admission that expiration of the pre-
paid letter of credit without having been honored had unjustly enriched
the bank. SeoulBank likewise had not refuted Lectrodryer's expert testi-
mony that, in seeking a waiver of "any discrepancies" from JDP,
SeoulBank had signaled its willingness to abide by JDP's decision. 243 Nor
had the bank disproved Lectrodryer's claim that SeoulBank had dis-
suaded JDP from using its credit line to pay Lectrodryer by feigning will-
ingness to extend the letter of credit until the credit line had expired.244
233. See Lectrodryer, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 882 & n.1.
234. Id. at 882.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 882.
237. See id. ("The trial court sustained SeoulBank's demurrer to [Lectrodryer's counts]
for fraud and intentional interference with contractual relations.").
238. Id. at 882, 884.
239. Id. at 883 (alternative holding).
240. Id. at 883 n.2 (alternative holding).
241. Id. at 882-83 ("SeoulBank does not dispute that it could not retain funds used to
purchase a pre-paid letter of credit if the letter of credit was closed after never having been
paid.").
242. Setoff would preclude unjust enrichment. See infra notes 261-65 and accompany-
ing text.
243. Lectrodryer, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884 (the expert testified that there would have
been "no reason" for SeoulBank to seek a general waiver of documentary discrepancies
from JDP without previously having determined to waive the discrepancies).
244. See id. at 883 n.2.
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Lectrodryer involved a commercial letter of credit that did not incorpo-
rate the UCP. The intermediate-appellate court's principal error was ac-
cepting Lectrodryer's assertion that, due to the letter of credit's
expiration, letter-of-credit law was irrelevant to the case.245 In North
American Foreign Trading Corp. v. Chiao Tung Bank,246 for example,
NAFT, a New York importer, obtained commercial letters of credit is-
sued by Barclays Bank of Zurich and payable to Huston Electronics, a
Taiwanese manufacturer. 247 Chiao Tung, a nominated bank, paid Huston
$1.8 million for the documents and presented them to Barclays for reim-
bursement. 248 However, the purchased documents had not included re-
quired inspection certificates, and Barclays dishonored after NAFT
refused to waive the discrepancies.2 49 Although Chiao Tung had not for-
warded the original bills of lading for the goods, NAFT subsequently ob-
tained possession of the goods by providing letters of indemnity to the
carriers.250
Chiao Tung sued NAFF for unjust enrichment under both New York
and California law, alleging that its 1.8 million dollar payment to Huston
enriched NAFT unjustly by enabling NAFT to obtain possession of the
goods without paying for them.251 However, the court ruled that:
There is simply no "injustice" which was perpetrated on Chiao Tung,
a sophisticated commercial entity which made a large payment to
Huston knowing that the proper documentation for collection under
the letters of credit had not been provided.2 52
There likewise had been no injustice to Lectrodryer in SeoulBank's dis-
honor of Lectrodryer's discrepant presentation even if the letter of credit
had been prepaid.253 Under California law, the jury finding that
SeoulBank was obligated to refund JDP's prepayment2 54 would not have
entitled either JDP or Lectrodryer to recover the refund. Lectrodryer
had not claimed that SeoulBank had held the prepaid funds in trust.2 55
Although it was undisputed that the prepayment had been made with the
245. See id. at 883 ("The focus of Lectrodryer's case was on what happened to the
proceeds of the sale of the sieve dryer after the letter of credit expired.").
246. No. 95 Civ. 5189 (LBS), 1997 WL 193197 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
247. Id. at *1.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at *2.
251. Id. at *2-3 (noting that both New York and California unjust enrichment law pro-
vide that justice must require restitution).
252. Id. at *9.
253. See supra note 233 and accompanying text with respect to Lectrodryer's presenta-
tion of the wrong transportation documents.
254. If a prepayment had been made, SeoulBank had not disputed that it was obligated
to refund the prepayment upon expiration of the letter of credit. See supra note 241 and
accompanying text.
255. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 227, at 24-33 (emphasizing that SeoulBank had
been unjustly enriched by retaining the proceeds of JDP's resale of the dryer). Moreover,
a claim that the prepayment involved a trust would have been rejected. No special circum-
stances had transformed SeoulBank's refund obligation into a trust obligation. See West-
steyn Dairy 2 v. Eades Commodities Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1075-86 (E.D. Cal. 2003)
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proceeds of JDP's resale of the sieve dryer,25 6 this had not been planned.
JDP initially wrote checks on its own account and used Dae Ahn's pay-
ment to buy replacement cashier's checks only upon dishonor of its own
checks.257 SeoulBank also denied knowing that the cashier's checks had
been purchased with Dae Ahn's funds.258
Moreover, whether or not there were grounds for imposing a construc-
tive trust upon SeoulBank's refund obligation, a constructive trust had
not been imposed in the trial court.2 59 The refund obligation was an ordi-
nary debt of SeoulBank that was subject to setoff against JDP's ordinary
mature obligations to the bank:260
Setoff . . . [is] that right which exists between two parties each of
whom under an independent contract owes an ascertained amount to
the other to set-off his respective debts by way of mutual deduction
so that in any action brought for the larger debt, the residue only,
after such deduction, shall be recovered. 2 61
The justification for setoff is efficiency. "[A] man should not be com-
pelled to pay one moment what he will be entitled to recover back the
next. '26 2 For setoff to be permissible, the debt collected through setoff
must be mature, and there must be mutuality of obligation between the
debts setoff in the sense that the parties must owe them to each other in
the same legal capacities.2 63
The facts of the Lectrodryer case indicated that SeoulBank had satis-
fied the prerequisites for setting off its refund obligation to JDP against
JDP's mature loans and in fact had done so.264 This setoff precluded un-
($1.1 million in prepayments by dairies to feed merchant did not involve express, construc-
tive, or resulting trusts).
256. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
257. Id.
258. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 227, at 12 n.9 (arguing that the jury would have
been justified in rejecting SeoulBank's claim of lack of knowledge of the source of the
funds).
259. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
260. If the prepayment had involved known trust funds, this would have precluded its
mutuality with JDP's debts to SeoulBank and prevented SeoulBank's setoff of its refund
obligation. See, e.g., Dockendorf v. Dakota County State Bank, 673 F.2d 961, 965 (8th Cir.
1981) (stating that, under Nebraska law, a bank that knows of a trust deposit can not satisfy
a claim against the depositor by setting off the trust deposit). This is the general rule. A
bank customer's trust obligation is held in a different legal capacity than the bank cus-
tomer's ordinary debts. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
261. John Wills, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Nebraska, 16 A.2d 804, 806 (N.J. 1940)
(quoting 24 R.C.L. 792).
262. William H. Loyd, The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 541 (1916).
263. See, e.g., All Am. Auto Salvage v. Camp's Auto Wreckers, 679 A.2d 627, 632 (N.J.
1996) (stating that the indebtedness that gives rise to setoff must be due and owing and
that mutuality of obligation must exist). With respect to setoffs involving bank accounts,
All American Auto Salvage also requires that the funds setoff be the property of the bank
and that the bank account be unrestricted. Id.
264. There had been mutuality of obligation and JDP's loan obligations had been in
default. Because JDP had not deposited Dae Ahn's payment with SeoulBank, the addi-
tional requirements necessary to setoff the balance in a deposit account were not applica-
ble. See Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 881, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). ("JDP
paid SeoulBank $492,000 with two cashier's checks."). In point of fact, JDP did not have a
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just enrichment of SeoulBank from the prepaid letter of credit's
expiration.2 65
The Lectrodryer court alternatively held that the jury could have be-
lieved the testimony of Lectrodryer's expert that SeoulBank waived the
documentary discrepancies. 266 Although the reported case does not state
this clearly, SeoulBank apparently had forwarded the presented docu-
ments to JDP without identifying discrepancies, inquiring whether JDP
would waive "any discrepancies" that existed.26 7 According to Lec-
trodryer's expert, there would have been no reason for SeoulBank to
seek JDP's general waiver unless the bank previously had determined to
comply with JDP's instructions. 26 8 However, the expert was wrong. It is
efficient for an issuer to postpone a decision about waiver until the appli-
cant has waived. If the applicant refuses to waive the documentary dis-
crepancies, the issuer is obligated to the applicant to dishonor.2 69 At
most SeoulBank's conduct had been ambiguous.270 SeoulBank should
have made its intention explicit by retaining the presented documents
and by coupling a request to JDP for waiver of specific discrepancies with
an express reservation of the independent privilege to decide whether to
waive. 271 This alternative holding of the Lectrodryer case is belied by
SeoulBank's dishonor notwithstanding JDP's waiver. The alternative
holding relied on questionable expert testimony to attribute an intention
to SeoulBank that the bank did not have.
272
In sum, two of the legal theories advanced by the appellate court in
Lectrodryer are unpersuasive. On the other hand, the appellate court's
third theory is consistent with the principle that the issuer is not bound by
deposit account with SeoulBank. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 227, at 7
(SeoulBank's agency office was not authorized to accept deposits from California corpora-
tions like JDP).
265. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 60 (1937) (the existence of an enforceable
duty to a transferee precludes restitution). Comment (a) adds, "If a person does an act
which it is his legal duty to do, whether such duty is enforceable at law or in equity, he is
not entitled to restitution, irrespective of the cause of the act." Id. § 60 cmt. (a); cf. Nation-
wide Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Star Fire Int'l, 889 F. Supp. 124, 125-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (al-
lowing a party unjustly enriched by an unauthorized wire transfer to set off a payment to
the plaintiff on account of the unjust enrichment by the third party that had instigated the
transfer).
266. Lectrodryer, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883-84 (alternative holding).
267. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 227, at 21 (SeoulBank's "general inquiry" to
JDP was "highly irregular"); id. at 34 (SeoulBank had JDP "review Lectrodryer's
documentation").
268. Lectrodryer, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883-84 (alternative holding).
269. See U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (unless otherwise provided or agreed with the applicant, the
issuer shall dishonor a presentation that does not appear on its face to comply); Barnes &
Byrne, 1998 Cases, supra note 4, at 1890 (the issuer may postpone a decision about waiver
until the issuer hears from the applicant).
270. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the manner in
which waiver should be requested.
272. See DOLAN, supra note 21, at 6-69 to 6-70 (the position of the expert in Lectrodryer
was "questionable").
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the applicant's waiver 273 and justifies the case's result. The jury could
have found that SeoulBank deliberately had misled JDP about the bank's
willingness to extend the letter of credit's expiration date until JDP's
credit line had expired.2 74 This intentional deception would have justified
estopping SeoulBank from precluding unjust enrichment by setting off its
refund obligation. 275
4. Overview of the U.C.C. Article 5 Approach to
Applicant Ad Hoc Waiver
The Official Comments to Article 5 frequently elaborate points either
merely touched on or omitted from the statutory text. The preambles to
Section 5-109(a)&(b), 276 for example, refer to "material fraud," but it is
Official Comment 1277 that explains that the existence of fraud is deter-
mined under general state law and the materiality of the fraud to the
enforceability of a letter of credit is determined under Article 5.278 Ap-
plicant ad hoc waiver of known documentary defects is treated almost
exclusively by Official Comments.279 Official Comments 1, 2, and 7 to
Section 5-108 deal with the subject, with Official Comments 1 and 2 also
referring to other matters.280 The substance of the Official Comments
dealing with applicant ad hoc waiver is reasonable with three exceptions:
(1) the Official Comment permitting contact with the applicant during the
examination process does not allude to the care with which this must be
done and could mislead the incautious; 281 (2) the Official Comment deal-
ing with the effect of contacting the applicant for a waiver of discrepan-
cies gives the erroneous impression that both Article 5 and UCP 500 per
se forbid allowing the applicant time to respond before expiration of the
seven-day outside deadline for notice of dishonor and discrepancies;282
and (3) the Official Comment fails to emphasize the distinctness of appli-
cant and issuer ad hoc waiver of known discrepancies, which could have
undermined the credibility of the expert testimony in the Lectrodryer
case that the applicant's waiver had been determinative. 283
273. See supra notes 214-23 and accompanying text for discussion of the issuer's not
being bound by the applicant's waiver of discrepancies.
274. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
275. See Lines v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 743 F. Supp. 176, 182-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (alternative holding) (setoff would be inequitable and impermissible with
respect to the beneficiary's liability for wrongfully drawing upon letters of credit); cf. E &
H Partners v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 39 F. Supp. 2d 275, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (alterna-
tive holding) (issuer estopped to claim that the presented documents were discrepant by its
"improper consultations" with the applicant).
276. U.C.C. § 5-109(a)-(b).
277. Id. § 5-109 cmt. 1.
278. Id. § 5-109 cmt. 1 ("Material fraud by the beneficiary occurs only when the benefi-
ciary has no colorable right to expect honor and where there is no basis in fact to support
such a right to honor.").
279. See supra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
280. U.C.C. § 5-108 cmts. 1, 2, 7.
281. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text.
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B. THE EFFECT OF UCP 500 AND ISP 98 UPON APPLICANT
AD Hoc WAIVER
If a letter of credit expressly incorporates rules of "custom or practice,
such as the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits,"
the formal name of UCP 500, the expressly incorporated rules supersede
conflicting Article 5 provisions that are variable. 2 84 The Article 5 treat-
ment of applicant ad hoc waiver is variable. 285 The treatment of issuer
preclusion to assert documentary discrepancies, which can make appli-
cant ad hoc waiver unnecessary, also is variable.
286
Both the text and comments of Article 5 refer to the UCP as rules of
custom or practice that, upon incorporation into a letter of credit, can
alter variable statutory provisions.2 87 Although ISP 98 was finalized after
the 1995 revision of Article 5, incorporated ISP 98 rules also can alter
variable Article 5 provisions. 288
The limited UCP 500 treatment of applicant ad hoc waiver has been
discussed.289 ISP 98 has two substantial rules on the subject. One rule
deals with the issuer's unsolicited request for the applicant's waiver, and
the other deals with the issuer's request for the applicant's waiver at the
behest of a presenter that has received notice of dishonor.
290
Rule 5.05 dealing with the issuer's unsolicited request for waiver by the
applicant is consistent with UCP 500 but not with the Article 5 Official
Comment stating that the issuer's contacting the applicant about waiver
cannot extend the reasonable time for a decision with respect to honor:
If the issuer decides that a presentation does not comply and if the
presenter does not otherwise instruct, the issuer may, in its sole dis-
cretion, request the applicant to waive non-compliance or otherwise
to authorise honor within the time available for giving notice of dis-
284. U.C.C. § 5-116(c) (the incorporated rules "govern except to the extent of any con-
flict with the nonvariable provisions"). The nonvariable provisions are listed in section 5-
103(c) and consist of (1) the definitions of "issuer" and "letter of credit," id. § 5-102(a)(9)-
(10); (2) the provision deeming letters of credit stating that they are "perpetual" to expire
in five years, id. § 5-106(d); (3) the provision declaring that the issuer and a nominated
person can not unreasonably withhold consent to the assignment of proceeds to an as-
signee in possession of a letter of credit that must be presented, id. § 5-114(d); and (4) the
provision requiring honor for equitable subrogation to be possible, id. § 5-117(d).
285. See id. § 5-103(c) (protecting only selected statutory provisions from variation).
286. Id. § 5-108(c)-(d) (dealing with issuer preclusion are not listed as unvariable in
section 5-103(c)).
287. Id. §§ 5-116(c), 5-116 cmt. 3.
288. Whether or not the ISP 98 rules reflect mercantile usage, see DOLAN, supra note
21, at 4-112 to 4-114 (stating that a number of ISP 98 rules do not reflect mercantile usage),
express incorporation of ISP 98 contractually waives inconsistent Article 5 rules that are
variable. See id. at 4-114 to 4-115 (incorporation of ISP 98 into a letter of credit makes it a
contract term).
289. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. The sole provision dealing with
applicant waiver is Sub-Article 14(c), which authorizes issuer discretion. See UCP 500,
supra note 6, art. 14(c) (stating that the Issuing Bank "may in its sole judgment approach
the Applicant for a waiver of the discrepancy(ies)").
290. OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, Rs. 5.05 (the issuer's unsolicited
request for the applicant's waiver), 5.06 (the issuer's asking the applicant for waiver at the
request of the presenter).
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honor but without extending it. Obtaining the applicant's waiver
does not obligate the issuer to waive non-compliance. 291
Official Comment 1 describes Rule 5.05 as "similar" to UCP 500 sub-
Article 14(c). 292 Official Comment 3 emphasizes the "rather obvious pro-
position" that neither the issuer's seeking nor the issuer's receiving a
waiver from the applicant obligates the issuer to waive discrepancies. 293
Most importantly, Rule 5.05 states that a request for a waiver by the ap-
plicant can be made "within the time available for giving notice of dis-
honour without extending it."'29 4 Rule 5.01 makes determinative whether
notice of dishonor was given at a time that was not unreasonable. 295 No-
tice given within three business days is deemed to be not unreasonable,
and notice given after seven business days is deemed to be unreasona-
ble.296 As to whether notice given between four and seven business days
is unreasonable, Professor James E. Byrne, the Chair and Reporter of the
Working Group that drafted ISP 98,297 has endorsed the previously-dis-
cussed IFSA Statement of Practice under UCP 500.298 Under the State-
ment of Practice, a request for applicant waiver extends the reasonable
time for honor or dishonor until the seven-day outside deadline for notice
of dishonor and discrepancies. 299 The Statement of Practice contains two
express exceptions.300 A requirement that the issuer ask for a prompt
response and an exception for the issuer's awareness of the imminent ex-
piration of the letter of credit are necessary to conform the Statement of
Practice to UCP 500.301 Although ISP 98 provides that an imminent ex-
piration date does not require the issuer to rush the examination of docu-
ments,302 this is consistent with awareness of an imminent expiration date
precluding the issuer from further delaying a decision with respect to dis-
honor in order to obtain the applicant's response to a request for
waiver.303 ISP 98 poses no impediment to the issuer's insertion of special
provisions in the letter of credit allowing retraction of both timely notice
291. See id. R. 5.05.
292. See id. R. 5.05 cmt. 1.
293. See id. R. 5.05 cmt. 3.
294. See id. R. 5.05.
295. See id. R. 5.01(a).
296. See id. R. 5.01(a)(i).
297. See supra note 20.
298. ISP 98 & UCP 500 COMPARED, supra note 40, R. 5.01 cmt. 4. See the discussion of
the IFSA Statement of Practice at supra notes 165-203. and accompanying text.
299. Statement of Practice, LC Rules & Laws, supra note 166, at 2.
300. The two express exceptions are an earlier refusal by the applicant and the issuer's
decision to dishonor whatever the applicant says. See supra note 168 and accompanying
text.
301. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need to
conform the Statement of Practice to UCP 500.
302. "Whether the time within which notice is given is unreasonable does not depend
upon an imminent deadline for presentation .... Unless a standby otherwise expressly
states a shortened time within which notice of dishonour must be given, the issuer has no
obligation to accelerate its examination of a presentation." OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP
98, supra note 20, R. 5.01(a)(ii), (iv).
303. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
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of dishonor and discrepancies and timely notice that the presented docu-
ments are being held for the presenter upon receiving a belated applicant
waiver in which an issuer that still has possession of the documents is
willing to join.30 4
Rule 5.06 deals with the issuer's request for a waiver by the applicant at
the request of the presenter. 305 The Rule provides in pertinent part:
If, after receipt of notice of dishonour, a presenter requests ...
that the issuer seek the applicant's waiver:
a. no person is obligated to... seek the applicant's waiver;
b. the presentation to the issuer remains subject to these Rules un-
less departure from them is expressly consented to by the pre-
senter; and
c. if... a waiver is sought:
i. the presenter is precluded from objecting to the discrepancies
notified to it by the issuer;
ii. the issuer is not relieved from examining the presentation
under these Rules;
iii. the issuer is not obligated to waive the discrepancy even if the
applicant waives it; and
iv. the issuer must hold the documents until it receives a response
from the applicant or is requested by the presenter to return
the documents, and if the issuer receives no such response or
request within ten business days of its notice of dishonour, it
may return the documents to the presenter.30 6
The Official Comments emphasize that, as under UCP 500, the issuer is
not required to seek a waiver at the presenter's request, that the pre-
senter's request for a waiver does not affect the issuer's deadline for
timely notice of dishonor and discrepancies, and that the applicant's
waiver of documentary discrepancies does not obligate the issuer to
waive.30 7
A novel aspect of Rule 5.06 provides that the issuer's seeking a waiver
of discrepancies from the applicant at the request of a presenter that has
received notice of dishonor bars the presenter from thereafter objecting
to the identified discrepancies. 30 8 Official Comment 4 states:
304. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
305. OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 1.09(a) (defining "presenter" as
a person making a presentation of required documents as or on behalf of the beneficiary or
a nominated person that has given value under the letter of credit). This is also the Article
5 definition. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(13).
306. OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 5.06.
307. See id. Rs. 5.06 cmts. 2 (no person is obligated to seek waiver), 5 (a request that the
issuer seek waiver does not excuse the issuer from its deadlines), 6 (the issuer's seeking and
receiving the applicant's waiver does not obligate the issuer to waive).
308. See id. R. 5.06(c)(i) ("the presenter is precluded from objecting to the discrepan-
cies notified to it by the issuer"). A more justifiable judge-made waiver rule had been
rejected in Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 819-20 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding that the beneficiary's concurrent submission of documents with discrepan-
cies to the issuer "on an approval basis" and urging the applicant to waive the discrepan-
cies did not waive the beneficiary's rights under UCP 400). The trial court had held that,
by concurrently asking the issuer to request a waiver and directly asking the applicant to
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Unless this Rule is expressly excluded . . . , the presenter and the
beneficiary are deemed to accept the determination that the docu-
ments are discrepant and cannot later assert them. This Rule re-
quires the beneficiary to take a position when it seeks waiver and
permits the . . . issuer to take the beneficiary's position into
account ....
As Official Comment 4 notes, after notice of dishonor has been given,
sub-Rule 5.06(c)(i) requires a presenter that had not expressly excluded
its applicability to abandon the contention that the documents are not
discrepant as the price for asking the issuer to request a waiver. 310 But
the Comment does not explain why this price is exacted.
The preclusion rule is confined to presenters that have received timely
notice of dishonor from the issuer. The common situation in which the
presenter requests that the applicant be contacted before being given no-
tice of dishonor is not covered. The rule consequently does not protect
issuers from expiration of the deadline for timely notice of dishonor and
discrepancies while the issuer is responding to the presenter's request
that a waiver be sought.311 The preclusion rule apparently is intended to
produce finality with respect to a presentation of documents that has
been dishonored in timely fashion. However, a presenter that is aware of
the preclusion rule either would make clear to the issuer that its request
that the applicant be contacted expressly excludes the applicability of
waive discrepancies, the beneficiary had waived its own right to preclude the issuer for not
giving notice of dishonor within a reasonable time. Alaska Textile Co. v. Lloyd Williams
Fashions, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1139, 1141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Because of the possibility of
issuer preclusion arising from the applicant's delay in responding to the issuer's request for
a waiver, Alaska Textile involved a more appealing context for presenter preclusion than
Rule 5.06, which imposes preclusion solely upon presenters who have received notice of
dishonor.
Rule 5.06 also deals with a second situation; namely, following dishonor by an examiner
other than the issuer, the presenter requests that the documents be forwarded to the issuer
so that the issuer can seek the applicant's waiver. See OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98,
supra note 20, R. 5.06 cmt. 1 (describing the two situations in which the rule applies). This
second situation is more comparable to the fact situation in Alaska Textile in that the issuer
is being asked both to suspend its judgment about discrepancies and to contact the appli-
cant. This is a more appropriate situation for presenter preclusion than a situation in which
the issuer has made a prior decision to dishonor and has given notice of dishonor and
discrepancies. It should be noted that the second situation covered by Rule 5.06 authorizes
an examiner to forward the presented documents to the issuer, not the issuer to forward
the presented documents to the applicant. The issuer's forwarding the presented docu-
ments to the applicant can be considered to impair the issuer's independence. See supra
notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
309. OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ISP 98, supra note 20, R. 5.06 cmt. 4.
310. Id.
311. See id. R. 5.06 ("If, after receipt of notice of dishonour, a presenter requests
that ... the issuer seek the applicant's waiver . . . ."). Failure to give timely notice of
dishonor with respect to a discrepancy precludes the issuer from thereafter asserting the
discrepancy with respect to the same presentation of documents. See id. R. 5.03(a) (pro-
viding that the preclusion applies to any document that is retained or re-presented but not
to a different presentation under the same or a different standby). If the issuer had failed
to give timely notice of dishonor and discrepancies and was precluded from asserting docu-
mentary discrepancies, the presenter would have no need to request that the applicant be
contacted for a waiver.
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sub-Rule 5.06(c)(1) 312 or would refrain from making a request that could
forestall an action for wrongful dishonor. On the other hand, a presenter
that was not aware of sub-Rule 5.06(c)(1) inadvertently could be pre-
cluded by a well-meaning effort to head off litigation.313
VI. CONCLUSION
The Independence Principle, the cornerstone of letter-of-credit law,314
dictates the treatment of applicant ad hoc waiver of known documentary
discrepancies. The Independence Principle requires that the issuer make
an independent determination as to the apparent facial conformity of the
documents presented with the letter of credit's terms and conditions. 315
Whether or not the presenter requests that the applicant be approached
for a waiver, the approach should not be made until the issuer has identi-
fied apparent documentary discrepancies. This identification is not a de-
cision to dishonor and does not require prompt notice of dishonor.316
The issuer should retain the actual documents presented, not provide
copies of all the originals, and limit its inquiry to the identified apparent
documentary discrepancies.317 The issuer also should make clear that, in
the event of the applicant's waiver, the issuer will make an independent
decision with respect to waiver.318 The presenter need not be informed.
If the presenter is informed, the presenter should be told that the issuer
will make an independent determination about waiver if the applicant
waives.319
If documentary discrepancies are identified in a normal examination
before an impending expiration date of which the issuer is aware, if the
applicant communicates a refusal to waive promptly, or if the issuer de-
cides not to waive even if the applicant does, the issuer must give prompt
312. The presenter can notify the issuer that the request to contact the applicant ex-
cludes the applicability of the preclusion provision. See id. R. 5.06(b) (providing that de-
parture from ISP 98 can be expressly consented to by the presenter); id. R. 5.06 cmt. 4(explaining that the request to seek a waiver can exclude the preclusion provision
expressly).
313. See John F. Dolan, Analyzing Bank Drafted Standby Letter of Credit Rules, The
International Standby Practice (ISP98), 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1865, 1896-1897 (2000) (Rule
5.06 is doubly inefficient in putting upon beneficiaries a burden that they would not rea-
sonably expect and in discouraging beneficiaries with a reasonable expectation of waiver
from asking issuers to contact applicants).
314. See McLaughlin, The Independence Principle, supra note 4, at 503 ("without the
independence principle, the letter of credit would cease to be a useful payment
mechanism").
315. See E & H Partners v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 39 F. Supp. 2d 275, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (alternative holding) (holding that the issuer, which had allowed the applicant un-
duly to influence the decision to dishonor, was estopped to dishonor).
316. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
317. The expert testimony in Lectrodryer that the issuer had left the ultimate decision
upon discrepancies to the applicant was influenced by the issuer's failing to limit contact
with the applicant to previously identified discrepancies and providing the applicant with
the documents presented. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text.
318. SeoulBank in Lectrodryer had failed to state this explicitly. See supra notes 266-72
and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
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notice of dishonor and discrepancies. 320 Otherwise, the issuer must urge
the applicant to respond as soon as possible, but a decision can be
delayed until the seven-day outside deadline for notice of dishonor and
discrepancies. 321 Moreover, if the applicant makes a belated waiver in
which the issuer concurs, special letter-of-credit provisions can authorize
an issuer that has retained possession of the documents to revoke both
timely notice of dishonor and discrepancies and timely notice that the
presented documents are being held for the presenter.
322
UCP 500 is more accommodating to clear requests for applicant waiver
that respect the Independence Principle than the Official Comments to
Article 5.323 With the exception of its presenter-preclusion rule, 324 so is
ISP 98.325
Two Article 5 Official Comments pose potential obstacles to effective
applicant waiver. The vague Official Comment permitting issuer contact
with the applicant during the examination process does not signal the
nuanced way in which this must be done.326 Most importantly, the Offi-
cial Comment indicating that a request for applicant waiver never can
affect the reasonable time for deciding whether to honor or to dishonor
unnecessarily could hamper the waiver process.327 The Official Comment
should be understood to mean that a request for applicant waiver can not
extend the seven-day outside deadline for notice of dishonor and discrep-
ancies.328 In any event, the Official Comment's relevance to issuer delay
within the seven-day outside deadline is variable and waived by the incor-
poration of UCP 500 or ISP 98 into a letter of credit.
329
320. See supra notes 180, 197-203 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 188-203 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text for criticism of the Official Com-
ments. However, the IFSA Statement of Practice under UCP 500 should be harmonized
with UCP 500. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 308-13 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
329. The court in DBJJJ, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank, regrettably failed to appreciate this
and used the Article 5 Official Comment to misinterpret sub-Article 13(b) as never permit-
ting an issuer to wait for an applicant's response prior to expiration of the seven-day
outside deadline. See DBJJJ, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904, 911 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004) ("This comment to the California Uniform Commercial Code is consistent with
the plain language of Article 13(b) .... ").
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